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INTRODUCTION: FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION AND STUDENT LOAN 
REPAYMENT PLANS 
The year 2014 has concluded, and it was the year of regulation for 
for-profit schools and, at the same time, expansion for federal student 
loan repayment plans, especially the Income-Based Repayment (IBR) 
Plan.1 The year 2015 looks no different. The relationship between the 
regulation of for-profit schools and the expansion of federal student 
loan repayment plans is growing more intertwined and urgent based 
upon recent events.2 The liberalization of repayment plans is 
resulting in more constrained attitudes towards for-profit schools.3 
The United States’ problem with the amount of federal student 
loan debt, and all other forms of educational loan debt has been a 
looming problem for decades.4 The amount of debt that exists is 
slowly becoming a potentially catastrophic problem for the American 
economy.5 The question of what to do with the all of the federal 
student loan debt is one that lawmakers are avoiding because there 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See College Cost Reduction and Access Act, Pub L. No. 110-84, sec. 203, § 493C(b), 121 Stat. 
784, 792 (2007) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b) (2012)). The Secretary of Education was 
given the authority to promulgate this repayment system effective July 1, 2009. See Higher Education 
Opportunity Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-315, § 451(a)(3), 122 Stat. 3078, 3261–62 (codified at 20 
U.S.C. § 1087e(d)(l)(E) (West 2011)). The IBR is a repayment plan that places a cap, or limit, on your 
monthly federal student loan payments based upon your discretionary income of the previous tax year. 
Slack, infra note 56. 
 2. See, e.g., Andrew Martin & Andrew W. Lehren, A Generation Hobbled by College Debt, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 13, 2012, at A1; Daniel de Vise, Student Loans Surpass Auto, Credit Card Debt, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 6, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/college-inc/post/student-loans-surpass-
auto-credit-card-debt/2012/03/06/gIQARFQnuR_blog.html. 
 3. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 2. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See infra Part I.A. 
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are no easy answers.6 However, every year the problem is getting 
worse as debt increases, with no real means of repayment.7 
Along with the increase of the federal student loan debt, the 
Bankruptcy Code also changed during the same period to increase the 
difficulty of discharging any kind of student loan debt, whether 
federally originated and insured or private.8 There have also been 
various repayment plans presented to extend, lower, or even negate 
federal student loan repayments.9 This approach, however, is just 
delaying the issue of dealing with the federal student loan debt 
problem without fixing the system, including the increasing costs of 
higher education. The goal of the federal government seems to be to 
provide any avenue to borrowers that enables them to avoid paying 
much of, if any, student loans without actually using the Bankruptcy 
Code to accomplish that result. It appears that for-profit schools are 
the roadblock to resolving federal student loan debt through either 
bankruptcy or loan forgiveness. 
Coinciding with the federal student loan debt issue, the Obama 
Administration, the Senate’s Health, Education, Labor & Pensions 
(HELP) Committee,10 the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB),11 and various state attorneys general have all gone after loan 
servicers and for-profit colleges that have abused student loan 
borrowers.12 There has been increasing attention on for-profit schools 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See generally Martin & Lehren, supra note 2. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, 90 Stat. 2081 (codified at 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1087-3 (1976)) (repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, ch. 90, § 316, 92 Stat. 2549 (stating the 
borrower must wait five years before filing for bankruptcy protection unless they could show an undue 
hardship)); see also Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789, 4964–65 (1990) (extending the time to seven 
years); Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 971, 112 Stat. 1581, 1837 
(eliminating the time-period completely); Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 220, 119 Stat. 23, 59. (changing the definition of “loans” to include any 
“qualified educational loan” which included private loans). 
 9. See infra Part I.A. 
 10. U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pension (HELP), Senator Lamar 
Alexander (R-TN) Chairman, www.help.senate.gov (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). 
 11. CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov (last visited Mar. 10, 
2016). 
 12. See, e.g., SEC, CORINTHIAN COLLS., INC, CURRENT REPORT (FORM 8-K) (Jan. 27, 2014) (stating 
that Corinthian Colleges was notified that 13 states’ Attorneys General were investigating the 
company’s business practices). Some of the states included the following actions: Complaint, 
Massachusetts v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., No. 14-1093 (Suffolk Sup. Ct. Apr. 3, 2014), 
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http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/press/2014/everest-complaint.pdf (alleging that this for-profit school 
aggressively recruited and misled students by falsely promising high quality, successful training 
programs, and instead left them with exorbitant student loan debt and without proper training or a well-
paying career); Complaint, Wisconsin v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., No. 2014 CX 00006 (Cir. Ct. of 
Milwaukee Cty. Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.doj.state.wi.us/sites/default/files/2014-news/complaint-
corinthian-colleges-20141027.pdf (alleging this action against Corinthian Colleges “for its use of false, 
misleading and deceptive representations to induce students to enroll in its post-secondary school 
‘Everest College, Milwaukee’”). The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau also filed suit against 
Corinthian. SEC, CORINTHIAN COLLS., INC, CURRENT REPORT (FORM 8-K) (Aug. 12, 2014) 
(investigating to “determine whether for-profit post-secondary companies, student loan origination and 
servicing providers, or other unnamed persons, have engaged or are engaging in unlawful acts or 
practices relating to the advertising, marketing, or origination of private student loans”); SEC, 
CORINTHIAN COLLS., INC, CURRENT REPORT (FORM 8-K) (Aug. 19, 2014) (asserting violations of 
Corinthian and stating a willingness to negotiate with Corinthian if the following were met: 
“(i) providing certain financial disclosure materials, (ii) ceasing the sale or transfer of private student 
loans, (iii) ceasing to engage in certain in-school collection efforts the CFPB considers unlawful, 
(iv) providing students and prospective students with the same disclosures regarding the potential sale of 
certain campuses that the Company has provided to California students as part of an agreement with the 
California Attorney General, and (v) notifying the CFPB of any indications of material interest in 
purchasing any of the Company’s assets”). See also SEC, CORINTHIAN COLLS., INC, CURRENT REPORT 
(FORM 8-K) (Jan. 24, 2014) (stating that Education Management Corporation received inquiries from 
twelve states regarding the Company’s business practices including practices relating to the “recruitment 
of students, graduate placement statistics, graduate certification and licensing results, and student 
lending activities, among other matters”); Press Release, Colorado Attorney General, Attorney General 
Suthers Announces Consumer Protection Settlement with Argosy University (Dec. 5, 2013), 
http://www.stopfraudcolorado.gov/about-consumer-protection/press-releases/2013-12-05-000000/ 
attorney-general-suthers-announces (based upon student complaints found that “beginning in 2007, 
Argosy deceptively marketed its EdD-CP program. Students were led to believe that Argosy was 
seeking to have the program accredited by the American Psychological Association (APA), which in 
fact was not the case. Upon graduating, students were moreover told they would be eligible to become 
licensed psychologists. In reality, the EdD-CP program’s curriculum and requirements were deficient 
and students were unlikely to obtain Colorado licensure”); SEC, ITT EDUC. SVCS., INC., CURRENT 
REPORT (FORM 8-K) (Jan. 27, 2014) (stating Attorneys General from 13 states were looking into the 
Company’s practices, “including marketing and advertising, recruitment, financial aid, academic 
advising, career services, admissions, programs, licensure exam pass rates, accreditation, student 
retention, graduation rates and job placement rates, as well as many other aspects of the Company’s 
business”); SEC, ITT EDUC. SVCS., INC., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) (Feb. 22, 2013) (referring to a 
subpoena from the SEC referring to (a) agreements that ITT entered into with an unaffiliated entity on 
February 20, 2009 to create a program that made private education loans available to our students to 
help pay the students’ cost of education that student financial aid from federal, state and other sources 
did not cover); SEC, ITT EDUC. SVCS., INC., CURRENT REPORT (FORM 8-K) (Sept. 15, 2014) (stating the 
DOE had determined that “the Company’s institutions are not financially responsible, a determination 
based solely on [a] missed submission deadline, and not on an assessment of the Company’s financial 
condition. Based on this determination, the ED, among other things: required the Company’s institutions 
to submit a letter of credit payable to the ED in amount of $79,707,879; placed the Company’s 
institutions on heightened cash monitoring for the receipt of Title IV Program funds”). There were 
additional companies mentioned in the lawsuits. See, e.g., SEC, CAREER EDUC. CORP., CURRENT 
REPORT (FORM 8-K) (Jan. 24, 2014); SEC, DEVRY, INC., CURRENT REPORT (FORM 8-K) (Apr. 15, 
2013); SEC, APOLLO GROUP, INC., CURRENT REPORT (FORM 8-K) (Oct. 22, 2010); SEC, WASH. POST 
CO., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) (Feb. 29, 2012); SEC, BRIDGEPOINT EDUC., INC., CURRENT 
REPORT (FORM 8-K) (Oct. 3, 2011); United States v. Stevens-Henager Coll., Inc., No. 1:13-cv-00009-
BLW, 2014 WL 3101817, at *1 (D. Idaho July 7, 2104). There were even more lawsuits filed in 2014 
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in recent years, and 2014 provided more doubt on the once thriving 
industry of for-profit colleges.13 The federal government essentially 
shutting down Corinthian Colleges for loan fraud is just one 
example.14 As a result, the American public is hesitant to forgive 
student loans. 
Additionally, in recent years, there were developments in the 
repayment of federal student loans. In total, there are now four 
variations of IBR plans.15 The implementation of IBR plans has 
increased scrutiny of for-profit schools. As these plans were 
implemented, scrutiny has increased because for-profit owners are 
essentially making free money off the American public. The question 
is whether this increased scrutiny of for-profit schools is a trend or an 
anomaly as the ability to repay federal student loan debt becomes 
more difficult. This Article argues that the increased scrutiny of for-
profit schools is not an anomaly and the increased scrutiny will 
continue as Congress and the President confront the growing federal 
student loan debt problem. 
The amount of federal student loan debt outstanding in America is 
hovering around one trillion dollars.16 At what future date will this 
debt become the next financial crisis?17 Just in 2010, borrowers 
incurred another $100 billion worth of federal student loan debt.18 
                                                                                                                 
against for-profit schools, but it would be an article in itself to list every one of them. 
 13. See, e.g., For-Profit Schools: Chronology of Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/ 
top/reference/timestopics/subjects/f/forprofit_schools/index.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2016) (providing 
a timeline of events related to for-profit schools). 
 14. See Kirk Carapezza, Federal Government Shuts Down For-Profit Corinthian Colleges, WGBH 
NEWS (July 10, 2014), http://wgbhnews.org/post/federal-government-shuts-down-profit-corinthian-
colleges (stating Corinthian was given six months to sell or close all of its campuses); see also Rohit 
Chopra, Special Announcement for Corinthian Students, CFPB (Feb. 3, 2015), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/special-announcement-for-corinthian-students/ (stating the DOC 
announced more the $480 million in forgiveness to borrowers that took out student loans to pay for 
Corinthian College’s for-profit programs). 
 15. Ryan Lane, Understand 4 Income-Driven Student Loan Repayment Plans, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT (Aug 27, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/student-loan-
ranger/2014/08/27/understand-4-income-driven-student-loan-repayment-plans. 
 16. Dennis Cauchon, Student Loans Outstanding Will Exceed $1 Trillion this Year, USA TODAY 
(Oct. 25, 2011, 1:23 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/perfi/college/story/2011-10-
19/student-loan-debt/50818676/1. 
 17. See Martha C. White, Is the Student-Loan Debt Crisis Worse than We Thought?, TIME (Nov. 29, 
2012), http://business.time.com/2012/11/29/is-the-student-loan-debt-crisis-worse-than-we-thought/. 
 18. Cauchon, supra note 16. 
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The amount of existing debt for federal student loans is higher than 
the amount of debt America has in automobiles or even credit 
cards.19 In the United States, the amount of federal student loan debt 
is second only to the amount of mortgage debt.20 For-profit schools 
and their non-profit disguises are a large factor behind these 
increases.21 
In fact, in 2012 the amount of student loan debt was just under $1 
trillion, auto loans were at $768 billion, and credit card debt stood at 
$674 billion.22 The gap between these types of debts is only getting 
wider.23 The rate of increase for student loan debt in 2012 was at a 
vigorous 4.6%, while the rate of increase for auto loans were 2.4% 
and that of credit cards were at a minuscule .3%.24 During this same 
period, home equity loans decreased at a 2.7% rate to $573 billion.25 
In 2013, the amount of student loan debt surpassed $1 trillion.26 
There is no indication that this trend is going to change or even slow 
down with the increased scrutiny of for-profit schools.27 The sheer 
amount of debt is just one issue concerning the rise of student loan 
debt in America. 
The average debt per student-borrower is also on the rise.28 Thus, 
it is not just a few borrowers producing the increase in the total 
amount of federal student loan debt.29 From 2005 to 2012, the 
average student loan debt per borrower increased from $17,233 to 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See Kelly Evans, Student Loans: The Next Bailout?, CNBC (Apr. 25, 2012, 8:49 AM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/47171658. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS, 111TH Cong., EMERGING RISK?: AN 
OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, SPENDING, STUDENT DEBT AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN FOR-PROFIT 
HIGHER EDUCATION 3 (2010) (noting that in the 2008–2009 school year approximately 25% of all 
student loans went to for-profit schools). 
 22. Carl Horowitz, Is a Federal Student Loan Bailout on the Horizon?, NAT’L LEGAL & POLICY 
CTR. (Mar. 1, 2013, 2:12 PM), http://nlpc.org/stories/2013/03/01/federal-student-loan-bailout-horizon. 
 23. See id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Cory Weinberg, Federal Student-Loan Debt Crosses $1-Trillion Threshold, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC. (July 17, 2013), http://chronicle.com/article/Federal-Student-Loan-Debt/140427/. 
 27. See Horowitz, supra note 22. 
 28. Halah Touryalai, More Evidence on the Student Debt Crisis: Average Grad’s Loan Jumps to 
$27,000, FORBES (Jan. 29, 2013, 3:22 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2013/01/29/ 
more-evidence-on-the-student-debt-crisis-average-grads-loan-jumps-to-27000/. 
 29. See id. 
6
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 1
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol32/iss3/1
2016] THE INCOME-BASED REPAYMENT PLANS 609 
$27,253.30 That is an incredible 58% increase during that period.31 
This occurred during the mortgage collapse between 2008 and 
2009.32 During this period, auto and credit card debt were decreasing, 
but federal student loan debt was skyrocketing.33 This was in part due 
to the boom of for-profit schools during this period.34 
Simultaneously, the default rates among student borrowers 
increased.35 In the fall of 2012, the Department of Education (DOE) 
released the number of borrowers who were already in default from 
the late 2009 and early 2010 beginning repayment period.36 The 
DOE’s numbers stated that 9.1% were already in default.37 That was 
up from 8.8% from the previous year.38 For-profit institutions 
actually saw a decline to 12.9% from a 15% default rate from the 
previous year.39 Nonetheless, the three-year default number 
ballooned to 13.4%.40 Nearly half of those numbers were still 
students from for-profit institutions, which gave for-profit institutions 
a 22.7% three-year default rate.41 
These defaults have led to additional expenses for the federal 
government.42 In the last fiscal year, the DOE paid debt collection 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Michael Stratford, Pointing a Finger at For-Profits, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Sept. 11, 2015), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/09/11/study-finds-profit-colleges-drove-spike-student-loan-
defaults. 
 35. See, Meghan Hoyer, More College Students Defaulting on Student Loans, USA TODAY (Sept. 
30, 2012, 10:57 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/09/28/college-default/ 
1591933/. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. This decline is somewhat dubious. Corinthian Colleges have had their employees go door-to-
door and give their former students gift certificates to entice delinquent borrowers to inquire about 
postponing their student loan payments. Chris Kirkham, For-Profit Colleges Manage Student Loan 
Default Rates, Senators Call for Investigation, HUFFPOST BUS. (Dec. 27, 2012, 5:33 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/27/for-profit-colleges-student-loan-default_n_2371688.html. 
Other for-profit schools have done similar things. Id. 
 40.  See Hoyer, supra note 35. 
 41. Id. Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) called the default rate for for-profit institutions “troubling.” Id. 
He further stated that this data “raises serious questions about the quality and value of the education 
students receive from these schools.” Id. 
 42. See Andrew Martin, Debt Collectors Cashing In on Student Loans, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/09/business/once-a-student-now-dogged-by-collection-
7
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companies more than $1.4 billion to collect on defaulted federal 
student loans.43 Because most borrowers would benefit from being 
placed on the IBR, should the federal government put something in 
place that would direct or even assist borrowers with being placed on 
IBR plans? This would lead to a possible savings of $1.4 billion 
dollars.44 
All of the federal government’s collection efforts lead to a negative 
impact for the borrower’s credit.45 With the amount of federal student 
loan debt that exists on people’s credit reports,46 at what point does 
this debt begin to drag the economy down because people are unable 
to purchase homes, automobiles, and other items? Many have argued 
that this process has already begun.47 It is interesting to note that 
during the age of the bank and automotive “bail-out” a few years ago, 
relieving federal student loan debt was not mentioned.48 Since then, 
there has been some discussion of a bailout of the federal student 
loan problem;49 however, nothing has been formalized by the federal 
government.50 Imagine how much money would have been generated 
for the American economy or how the mortgage crisis may have been 
lessened if the bailout included federal student loans. However, this 
will never be discussed until for-profit schools are made exempt from 
any bailout process. 
                                                                                                                 
agencies.html?pagewanted=1&pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. 
 45. For a detailed explanation on how student loans appear on credit reports see Mark Cappel, Learn 
How Long Student Loans Appear on Credit Reports, BILLS.COM (Nov. 20, 2007), http://www.bills.com/ 
student-loans-on-credit-report/. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See, e.g., Alex Gomory, Student Loan Debt Prevents Obtaining Home Loans (Feb. 20, 2012, 
9:59 AM), http://loans.org/student/news/debt-prevent-obtaining-home-91969; Bob Willis, Student 
Loans Near $1 Trillion Hurt Young U.S. Buyers: Mortgages, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Feb. 16, 2012, 
12:00 AM ), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-02-16/student-loans-approaching-1-trillion-
hurting-first-time-buyers-mortgages. 
 48. See Evans, supra note 19 (discussing the possibility of the need for a bailout for federal student 
loans). 
 49. See, e.g., Calls for Wiping Out Student Loan Debt Leave Americans Split on New ‘Bailout’, FOX 
NEWS (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/10/18/moveon-pushes-petition-calling-
for-wiping-out-all-student-loan-debt/ (referring to a petition that has over 600,000 signatures to bailout 
federal student loan borrowers). 
 50. See id. 
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Nonetheless, that period has passed and all that is left is an 
unbelievable amount of federal student loan debt and no foreseeable 
way of getting it paid off. In addition, bankruptcy courts continue to 
the use the harsh Brunner test in determining the dischargeability of 
student loans even with repayment plans like the IBR showing that 
Brunner is an antiquated test.51 The U.S. went through a mortgage 
crisis and did nothing to address the looming student loan crisis. This 
Article argues that the student loan issue will be the next financial 
crisis in America. The U.S. needs to address student debt and the 
continuing cause of that debt. Additionally, the issues that surround 
for-profit schools must be resolved before the student loan crisis can 
be resolved. 
Part I of this Article discusses the historical development of 
student loan repayment plans, focusing on the IBR and its features, 
and reviews proposals by the Gates Foundation and Obama 
Administration that impact IBR plans and for-profit education. Part II 
explores recent scrutiny and controversy surrounding for-profit 
colleges and their conversion to non-profits in disguise. Part III 
explains the history of opposition against for-profit schools. Part IV 
analyzes the Brunner test under the Bankruptcy Code and argues that 
the test is now obsolete due to the increase in student loan debt and 
the emergence of repayment plans like the IBR. Finally, Part V 
addresses the future of student loan dischargeability in bankruptcy. 
Specifically, the Article proposes solutions to the student debt crisis 
in the midst of the public’s hesitance to endorse the discharge of 
student debt from for-profit schools. 
I.   REPAYMENT PLANS 
Some good news from the federal student loan market: the total 
new federal loan volume will decrease slightly from 2014, “mostly 
because of a decline in demand as people find work and pass up 
school.”52 However, the existing borrowing base will continue to 
                                                                                                                 
 51. See discussion infra Parts IV.A, V.B. 
 52. John Sandman, 2015 Student Loan Outlook: Regulators May Regulate, But the Lenders Will Still 
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borrow more and more.53 In addition, private student loan volume 
will grow, partially based upon the high costs of for-profit 
education.54 Nevertheless, the amount of federal student loan debt is 
only increasing.55 The question is what can be done? 
A.   The Income-Based Repayment Plans 
The latest and most effective repayment plan is the Income-Based 
Repayment Plan or IBR.56 Congress enacted the IBR as a part of the 
2007 College Cost Reduction and Access Act (CCRA).57 The CCRA 
aided borrowers experiencing partial financial difficulties while 
trying to repay their federal student loans.58 It became available to 
student loan borrowers on July 1, 2009. This was convenient timing 
given the real estate and mortgage markets at the time.59 The years 
2007 and 2008 were dark years for the American economy due to the 
housing collapse.60 Americans needed alternatives to repaying their 
federal student loans more than ever. Although the Government 
enacted the CCRA before the mortgage collapse, or as the collapse 
was beginning, it benefited Americans struggling to pay their debts 
during the mortgage collapse.61 
                                                                                                                 
Lend, MAINSTREET (Jan. 29, 2015, 09:00 AM), http://www.mainstreet.com/article/2015-student-loan-
outlook-regulators-may-regulate-but-the-lenders-will-still-lend. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Horowitz, supra note 22. 
 56. See Megan Slack, How President Obama Is Helping Lower Monthly Student Loan Payments, 
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Oct. 26, 2011, 11:11 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/10/26/how-
president-obama-helping-lower-monthly-student-loan-payments. 
 57. College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-84, 121 Stat. 784 (2007) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.), formerly College Cost Reduction Act of 2007, 
H.R. 2669, 110th Cong., 1st Session (2007), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HR02669: 
@@C@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). 
 58. See id. 
 59. Michael Kondracki, The State of the Commercial Real Estate Mortgage Market: 2009–2010 Will 
be a Difficult Year, NEW ENGLAND REAL ESTATE J., Apr. 14, 2009, http://nyrej.com/31376. 
 60. Nearly 150 Mortgage Operations Collapse in 2007, MORTGAGE DAILY, 
http://www.mortgagedaily.com/PressRelease012208.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). 
 61. College Cost Reduction & Access Act: Public Service Loan Forgiveness, CAMPUS COMPACT, 
http://compact.org/initiatives/policy-and-advocacy/college-cost-reduction-access-act-public-service-
loan-forgiveness/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). 
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The IBR is an alternative to existing repayment plans such as the 
Income Contingent Repayment Plan (ICR).62 The ICR was the 
federal government’s first attempt to assist student loan 
debtors/borrowers with their repayments.63 The ICR, along with other 
alternative repayment plans, is not going away; thus, the IBR is 
another repayment plan enacted to assist borrowers with federal 
student loan repayment plan options.64 The IBR, however, 
specifically aids borrowers that pursue lower paying careers or 
choose public service jobs and have accumulated a large amount of 
student loan debt.65 Nevertheless, any borrower can apply for any of 
these repayment options, and in many cases, these options can benefit 
any borrower.66 
The IBR is a repayment plan that places a cap, or limit, on your 
monthly federal student loan payments based upon your discretionary 
income the previous tax year.67 This is similar to the ICR, but each 
plan has a different cap and different definition of what discretionary 
income means.68 When Congress enacted the IBR, the cap for the 
payment was 15% of the student loan borrower’s discretionary 
income.69 Discretionary income is defined by the IBR as “the 
difference between [the borrower’s] adjusted gross income (AGI) and 
150% of the federal poverty line that corresponds to [the borrower’s] 
family size and . . . state . . . .”70 
When this Act originally passed in 2007, it assisted student loan 
borrowers that had a partial financial hardship.71 This type of 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Income-Based Repayment, FINAID, http://www.finaid.org/loans/ibr.phtml (last visited Mar. 10, 
2016). 
 63. See 139 CONG. REC. S5585 (daily ed. May 6, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (arguing for the 
passage of the repayment plan that income contingency would make it possible for borrowers “to pursue 
careers and to take lower paying jobs they prefer, including careers in public service and community 
service”). He further stated that not everyone needs or wants to be a lawyer or investment banker. Id. 
 64. See FINAID, supra note 62. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. 
 67. Slack, supra note 56. 
 68. FINAID, supra note 62. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.; see also The Federal Poverty Guidelines, 78 Fed. Reg. 16, 5182-83 (Jan. 24, 2013) 
(containing all fifty states’ and the District of Columbia’s poverty levels). 
 71. 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(a)(3) (2012). 
11
Smith: The Income-Based Repayment Plans
Published by Reading Room, 2016
614 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:3 
borrower is defined as a high-debt but low-income borrower.72 If 
borrowers qualify as having a partial financial hardship, then they are 
entitled to a payment reduction.73 Even if the borrower is in default 
with their student loans, they can still qualify for this repayment 
plan.74 The IBR plan was the “brainchild” of Senator Edward 
Kennedy.75 
The IBR’s payment reduction amounts to 15% or 10%76 of the 
borrower’s adjusted gross income exceeding the 150% of the federal 
poverty line, depending on which form of the IBR the borrower 
chooses.77 The number arrived at can be adjusted according to the 
borrower’s family size and state.78 The federal poverty line is an 
officially defined number based upon information derived from the 
United States Census Bureau.79 This number is revised annually and 
is used as the criteria for many federal programs beyond the IBR.80 If 
the borrower is married and files taxes separately from a spouse, the 
payment is calculated based solely upon the borrower’s federal 
student loan debt and adjusted gross income.81 In summary, if the 
borrower qualifies, the borrower then is obligated to pay only fifteen 
percent of the borrower’s adjusted gross income less 150% of the 
borrower’s family poverty level.82 The result for the borrower is a 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Educational Loan Notes, MICH. GUAR. AGENCY, July 2009, http://www.michigan.gov/ 
documents/mistudentaid/ELNJuly09_286394_7.pdf. 
 73. 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(1) (2012). 
 74. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.220(b)(2) & (h)(2) (2013) (referring to the ICR); 34 C.F.R. § 682.215 
(2013) (referring to the IBR). 
 75. 20 U.S.C. § 1098e (2012); Philip G. Schrag, Federal Student Loan Repayment Assistance for 
Public Interest Lawyers and Other Employees of Governments and Nonprofit Organizations, 36 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 27, 35 (2007). The formula to calculate the IBR payment is also located at 34 C.F.R. 
§ 682.215(b)(1) (2013). 
 76. See 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(e)(1) (2012) (stating “[w]ith respect to any loan made to a new borrower 
on or after July 1, 2014,” the payment cap will be lowered from 15 percent to 10 percent). 
 77. 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(a)(3)(B) (2012). 
 78. See FINAID, supra note 62. 
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 9902(2) (2012). 
 80. Id.; see also Poverty Thresholds, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/ 
poverty/data/threshld/index.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2016) (showing the poverty rates over the last 
few decades). 
 81. 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(d) (2012). 
 82. See Educational Loan Notes, supra note 72. 
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lower payment than can be achieved through other repayment 
plans.83 
The payment, once configured, is based upon a yearly number and 
then divided by twelve.84 Under the IBR, the borrower’s payment 
could change each year because the payment is based upon the 
previous year’s taxes.85 This type of payment calculation may not be 
accurate. Thus, if a borrower suffers a reduction of income in the 
current year, they can submit forms with the federal government to 
have their payment reduced.86 However, since this is a partial 
financial hardship payment plan, the payment may not actually cover 
what a normal payment would—principal and interest.87 Under the 
IBR, if the borrower qualifies for a reduced payment, the amount 
paid first goes towards the interest on the loan.88 Second, it goes 
towards any fees that may be owed and then, finally, towards the 
actual principal of the loan.89 
The IBR treats subsidized and unsubsidized loans differently as 
well.90 If the borrower has subsidized loans and qualifies for the IBR 
plan, the IBR essentially treats the student loans as if they are 
deferred.91 For three years after being placed on the IBR, the federal 
government will pay the interest that is due on the loans.92 This is the 
same structure as if the borrower has his student loan in deferment.93 
However, if the student loans are unsubsidized, then the unpaid 
interest that is accrued is capitalized and becomes part of the 
                                                                                                                 
 83. See, e.g., In re Ristow, No. ADV. 10-01141-EWH, 2012 WL 1001594, at *3 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
Mar. 26, 2012) (stating the debtor’s payment under the ICR was $479.97 and under the IBR it was 
$268.91). 
 84. 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(1) (2012). 
 85. FINAID, supra note 62. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(2) (2012). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(3) (2012). 
 91. 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(3)(A) (2012). 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. 
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principal.94 Lastly, any principal not paid in the IBR payment is also 
deferred.95 
If the borrower stays within the IBR structure for twenty or 
twenty-five years,96 he or she is eligible for student loan forgiveness, 
meaning her student loans are cancelled.97 The cancelled amount is 
taxable though, which could be crippling to any borrower.98 Because 
this law is relatively new, no borrower has reached this twenty or 
twenty-five year period.99 Therefore, Congress and future presidents 
have plenty of time to adjust this result. The IBR and ICR 
repayments represent the current Congress and President of the 
United States deferring the issue of actually solving the federal 
student loan problem to a later congress and presidential 
administration. 
Nevertheless, the tax consequences have influenced bankruptcy 
courts’ determinations of what constitutes a borrower’s good faith 
effort to repay federal student loans. In response to a debtor’s 
argument for discharge because any forgiveness of the remaining 
student loan in twenty-five years under the ICR would be a taxable 
event with a high tax liability, a district court in Education Credit 
Management Corporation v. Stanley (In re Stanley)100 found that 
“[f]orecasting such a tax liability under whatever tax laws will be in 
effect in [twenty-five] years would be sheer speculation. Forecasting 
the effect any such liability would have on [the borrower’s] actual 
standard of living at that time would be even more speculative.”101 
                                                                                                                 
 94. 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2012). 
 95. 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(4) (2012). 
 96. See 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(e)(2) (2012) (lowering the original twenty-five years to twenty years for 
all new borrowers after 2014). 
 97. 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(7) (2012). 
 98. See Schrag, supra note 75, at 55–56 (describing the taxability of the forgiveness because it is not 
dependent on any work by the borrower for any “particular class of employers”). But see Gregory 
Crespi, Will the Income-Based Repayment Program Enable Law Schools to Continue to provide 
“Harvard-Style” Legal Education?, 67 S.M.U. L. REV. 51, 82 (2014) (stating borrowers under the 
Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program will not be subject to the taxable income provision). 
 99. See FINAID, supra note 62. 
 100. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Stanley (In re Stanley), 300 B.R. 813, 818–19 n.8 (N.D. Fla. 2003). 
 101. See id. (referring to the potential tax liability of the ICRP); see also Gibson v. ECMC (In Re 
Gibson), 428 B.R. 385, 392 (2010) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1)(B) stating that tax laws may change 
before the twenty-five years pass and currently the Internal Revenue Code may already provide an 
exclusion of this type of income). 
14
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 1
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol32/iss3/1
2016] THE INCOME-BASED REPAYMENT PLANS 617 
Not considering the tax as a possible liability, this calculated 
plan’s result essentially just allows for most borrowers under the IBR 
to pay less than 10% of their gross income to their student loan 
debt.102 Most types of federal student loans are also eligible for the 
plan’s adjusted payment structure.103 As previously stated, the 
purpose of the IBR plan is to lower the monthly payments for student 
loan borrowers that have high loan debt amounts and only modest to 
low incomes.104 If the monthly payment amount is lower under the 
IBR than the borrower’s monthly eligible loan payments under a ten-
year standard repayment plan, then the borrower is eligible to repay 
her loans under IBR.105 In fact, there is no minimum payment 
required with the IBR plan.106 A borrower’s payment could actually 
be zero each month and that would count as an actual payment made 
that month.107 In theory, a borrower could go the entire repayment 
plan period without paying anything. This aspect of the IBR could 
make the question of including federal student loans in bankruptcy 
moot. This is because the IBR plan allows the borrower to make the 
modified payments for the twenty-five year period and the remaining 
balance to be “forgiven”—essentially like a bankruptcy discharge.108 
The size of the remaining balance does not matter.109 However, the 
disadvantage is that the forgiven amount is taxable under current 
law.110 
This tax consequence could pose a serious consequence for 
borrowers that have large amounts forgiven.111 This aspect of the 
                                                                                                                 
 102. See generally In re Stanley, 300 B.R. at 818–19 n.8. 
 103. Slack, supra note 56 (stating loans in default and Parent PLUS Loans are not eligible for the IBR 
plan); Federal Student Aid, DEP’T OF EDUC., http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/understand/plans/ 
income-based (stating that private education loans are not eligible either). However, see FINAID, supra 
note 62, which states that Parent PLUS Loans can be included if the borrower has consolidation them 
into a consolidation loan in the Direct Loan program. Other conditions apply. See id. 
 104. Slack, supra note 56. 
 105. Id. 
 106. FINAID, supra note 62. 
 107. See, e.g., Krieger v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 713 F.3d 882, 886 (7th Cir. 2013); Stevenson v. 
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Stevenson), 463 B.R. 586, 592 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011); Marshall v. 
Student Loan Corp. (In re Marshall), 430 B.R. 809, 814 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010). 
 108. In re Stevenson, 463 B.R. at 592. 
 109. Id. 
 110. FINAID, supra note 62. 
 111. See id. 
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IBR needs to be abolished. This change would make the IBR a 
pseudo-Bankruptcy Code for federal student loans. Because there is 
still about twenty years before the first person reaches the situation of 
having their federal student loan balances forgiven,112 this law could, 
should, and most likely will be changed before that event happens. 
Nonetheless, the IBR plan treats borrowers as if they are on a 
deferment plan if their income is at or near the 150% federal poverty 
line for the first three years they are on the plan.113 This aspect of the 
IBR allows borrowers to switch to another repayment plan within the 
first three years without suffering any penalties. 
The borrower’s monthly payments depend upon various factors, so 
it is best to use the IBR calculator in determining the payment size.114 
Because the Federal Government changes the national poverty rate 
each year, the borrower must be aware of the current calculation.115 
Essentially, the borrower’s payment has the propensity to change 
each tax year based upon his or her income in comparison to the 
federal poverty level. This means a borrower may see an ever-
increasing payment amount as her income increases from one year to 
the next. 
Another factor considered by potential participants of this plan is 
whether their IBR payment covers the interest portion of their federal 
student loans. If it does not, the government will pay the interest on 
the subsidized loans for up to three years.116 This is similar to what 
other existing payment plans provide.117 As a result, any interest not 
paid by minimum monthly payments will not be capitalized even if 
the interest accrues during the IBR payment period.118 However, 
because most borrowers choosing to use the IBR payment method 
will not be paying all of the monthly interest, the amount of interest a 
                                                                                                                 
 112. See id. 
 113. 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(b)(3)(A) (2012). 
 114. See FINAID, supra note 62 (containing the calculator and the reference table). 
 115. See Income-Based Repayment, AFFILIATED COMPUT. SERVS., https://www.acs-
education.com/CS/Jsp/loanoptions/ibr.jsp (listing the federal poverty level for 2013) (last visited Mar. 
10, 2016). 
 116. FINAID, supra note 62. 
 117. See generally Federal Student Aid, supra note 103. 
 118. See FINAID, supra note 62. 
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borrower will pay over time may be higher than what it would be if 
the borrower were to pay the interest off every month.119 Thus, unless 
the current law is changed as a result of the negative amortization 
possibility of the IBR, a borrower’s potential tax liability may be 
substantially higher than the original amount borrowed. 
In 2010, with the passage of the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act,120 monthly payments under the IBR were 
reduced to 10% of discretionary income instead of 15%.121 This 
effectively reduced borrowers’ monthly payments by one-third from 
the already reduced amount.122 Additionally, this Act reduced the 
number of years a borrower is required to pay into the plan to only 
twenty years.123 However, these changes only apply to new 
borrowers and not to borrowers that currently have federal student 
loan debts.124 President Obama signed an executive order making this 
plan effective for new loans established after July 1, 2012.125 
Nevertheless, borrowers that obtained their federal student loans 
before 2012 can use the plan discussed above if they consolidate their 
student loans after July 1, 2012.126 
The high balances of federal student loans continue to define the 
lives of many borrowers today.127 For example, millennials (the 
generation born from the early 1980s to early 2000s) with student 
loans are driving a shift from home ownership to Generation Rent.128 
Millennials have been starting families and buying homes later than 
their predecessor generations.129 The National Association of 
                                                                                                                 
 119. Federal Student Aid, supra note 103. 
 120. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). 
 121. FINAID, supra note 62. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. (stating the effective date is for borrowers that took out new loans after July 1, 2014). 
 125. Reyna Gobel, Will Obama’s Executive Order on Student Loans Help You?, MINTLIFE (Oct. 27, 
2011), http://www.mint.com/blog/credit/will-obamas-executive-order-on-student-loans-help-you-102 
011/. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See, e.g., Josh Boak, Millennials Buying Homes Later in Life, USA TODAY (July 19, 2014, 5:03 
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2014/07/19/millennials-buying-homes-
later-in-life/12839353/ (referring to census data). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
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Realtors notes that nearly half of Americans said student loan debt is 
a huge obstacle to buying a home.130 First-time home buyers are an 
important, if not essential, part of the American economy.131 If they 
cannot purchase a starter home, then they are less likely to pay for 
appliances or renovations to property they do not own.132 According 
to recent studies, this generation is waiting longer to buy their first 
homes and this trend is likely to continue.133 If homebuilders are not 
building for Millennials, then products are not moving as quickly out 
of Lowes, Home Depot, or similar places as they might otherwise.134 
Something must be done to change how student loans are handled. 
B.   The Gates Foundation135 
Every indication is that there will be increased attention on the 
IBR over the coming years. This attention may focus on additions to 
the plan, including automatic payroll deductions of federal student 
loan payments.136 The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is pushing 
student loan borrowers to enroll in an IBR plan as soon as they leave 
school and get a job.137 The spirit of the Gates Foundation’s proposal 
                                                                                                                 
 130. See Les Christie, Is Student Loan Debt Hurting the Housing Recovery?, CNN MONEY (Sept. 25, 
2014, 1:38 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/09/24/real_estate/student-loan-debt-home-buying/index. 
html (referring to a housing market survey of 2,000 Americans). 
 131. See Diana Hill, Is Home Ownership Still the American Dream?, ONLINE TRAINING ACAD. (Oct. 
22, 2013), http://lessons.tradingacademy.com/article/is-homeownership-still-the-american-dream/ 
(discussing the economic impact of homeownership and first-time buyers). 
 132. See Bill Conerly, Should You Buy A House Or Rent? The Economics of Home Ownership, 
FORBES (Nov. 11, 2013, 2:54 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/billconerly/2013/11/11/should-you-
buy-a-house-or-rent-the-economics-of-homeownership/ (discussing the responsibilities and rights of 
home renters and homeowners). 
 133. See Christie, supra note 130. 
 134. See Mike Duff, Home Depot Gains by Turning Recession into Opportunity, CBS NEWS (Aug. 
24, 2010, 2:31 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/home-depot-gains-by-turning-recession-into-
opportunity/ (discussing downturn in new homebuilding because of recession). 
 135. BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., http://www.gatesfoundation.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). 
 136. See Chris Morran, New Bill Would Take Income-Based Student Loan Payments Straight From 
Your Paycheck, CONSUMERIST (Dec. 4, 2012), http://consumerist.com/2012/12/04/new-bill-would-take-
income-based-student-loan-payments-straight-from-your-paycheck/ (discussing proposed law allowing 
“automatic payroll deductions tied to the borrower’s income”). 
 137. How We Work Grant: New America Foundation, BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND. (Aug. 2014), 
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/How-We-Work/Quick-Links/Grants-
Database/Grants/2014/08/OPP1116365. In August 2014, the Gates Foundation provided a $235K Grant 
to the New America Foundation to work with policymakers in determining how to implement an 
automatic IBR system to assist the student loan repayment process. Id. 
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is to make student loan repayment mandatory on the borrower by 
collecting student loan payments through the federal payroll 
withholding system.138 This sounds like a unique and intriguing 
approach to federal student loan issues. However, this unique 
approach raises many questions. The first question is whether the 
borrower will be forced to choose a particular IBR plan, or whether 
the borrower may choose the plan the borrower wants.139 Because 
there are currently multiple payment plan options, enforcement 
remains problematic.140 The second question is how would the 
federal government enforce this approach.141 The Gates Foundation 
has provided money to look into this issue.142 
The third question is whether, in instances where some form of 
IBR is required, privacy issues will prevent employers from 
collecting student loan debts and discussing payment options, 
information about employees that employers would not have had 
access to before.143 Lastly, would businesses incur additional costs to 
be involved in the student loan debt collection process?144 If so, 
would the government reimburse the businesses for those costs?145 
The Gates Foundation is trying to answer some of these questions 
with the use of their grants. The principal focus of the Gates 
Foundation research grants is to eliminate the need for debt collection 
on student loans, provided the borrower stays employed, thus 
eliminating most student loan defaults.146 The difficulty of making 
the necessary contingency plans for those borrowers not able to find 
                                                                                                                 
 138. See id. 
 139. See Federal Student Aid: Repayment Plans, DEP’T OF EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-
loans/understand/plans (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). 
 140. How We Work Grant: Center for Community Change, BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND. (June 
2013), http://www.gatesfoundation.org/How-We-Work/Quick-Links/Grants-Database/Grants/2013/06/ 
OPP1091149. In June, 2013, the Gates Foundation provided a grant to the Center for Community 
Change to research and analyze the various forms of the IBR and look into potential reforms. Id. 
 141. See Lauren Smith, Petri Preparing Plan to Overhaul Federal Student Loan System, ROLL CALL 
(Oct. 3, 2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/petri_preparing_plan_to_overhaul_federal_ 
student_loan_system-218986-1.html. 
 142. How We Work Grant: Center for Community Change, supra note 140. 
 143. See Sandman, supra note 52. 
 144. See Ed Lieber, Don’t Get Stuck With Your Employee’s Student Loan Debt, SMALL BUS. TRENDS 
(May 26, 2015), http://smallbiztrends.com/2015/05/dont-get-stuck-employees-student-loan-debt.html. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See Sandman, supra note 52. 
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employment, those who lose their jobs, or those who find only 
temporary work, could derail this aggressive plan. However, this 
approach could be better for student loan borrowers who want to 
repay their student loans but have trouble accomplishing that while 
maintaining a normal lifestyle.147 
C.   Free Community College Tuition 
President Obama’s ambitious plan to make community colleges 
free to most students who maintain a 2.5 grade point average 
(GPA)148 will be well-received by many Americans. With taxpayers 
already paying most of the tuition for community colleges,149 most 
Americans would probably accept this proposal. Nevertheless, free 
college tuition does not sit well with many other Americans.150 One 
consideration is that only about a third of community college students 
currently enrolled on at least a half-time basis maintain a 2.5 or 
higher GPA on a 4.0 scale, based on data from the 2011–2012 
National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey.151 It is arguable that the 
prospect of a tuition-free option would motivate many more students 
to achieve that goal. 
The impact on for-profit schools will be catastrophic if the 
President’s plan is adopted. Because most students would be drawn 
to the possibility of a free Associate’s Degree, who would want to 
pay $50,000–$75,000 to get the same degree from a for-profit 
                                                                                                                 
 147. See id. 
 148. See Michael Gonchar, Should a College Education be Free?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2015, 5:00 
AM), http://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/23/should-a-college-education-be-free/comment-page-
3/?_r=0 (stating also that if all the states participate in the program, it could cover up to nine million 
students, saving an average of $3,800 a year per student). 
 149. See MARK SCHNEIDER & LU (MICHELLE) YIN, AMERICAN INSTS. FOR RESEARCH, THE HIDDEN 
COSTS OF COMMUNITY COLLEGES 6 (Oct. 2011) (referring to the costs to taxpayers when a student 
drops out of the community college). 
 150. See, e.g., Jim Namiotka, College for Free? America Can Afford it: Opinion, NJ.COM (Aug. 18, 
2013, 7:00 AM), http://blog.nj.com/njv_editorial_page/2013/08/college_for_free_america_can_a.html 
(stating the biggest impediment is that higher education is big business); Jordan Weismann, How 
Washington Could Make College Tuition Free (Without Spending a Penny More on Education), THE 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/03/how-washington-
could-make-college-tuition-free-without-spending-a-penny-more-on-education/273801/ (stating the a 
free education would cause a flood of students and that could possibly harm poorer students). 
 151. See Sandman, supra note 52. 
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school? This plan means the death of for-profit schools and all of the 
controversy surrounding them. Moreover, it would eliminate a large 
part of future federal student loan debt. This plan could be the change 
in the system many have been looking for in this country, but it 
depends on current politics. 
II.   PRO-PROFIT AND THE LAWSUIT TSUNAMI 
As mentioned above, for-profit schools and their non-profit twins 
are under more legal and legislative scrutiny than ever, and it appears 
well-deserved. For example, the Senate’s HELP Committee in 2012 
examined thirty for-profit schools and found that fifty-four percent of 
students who started at these colleges in 2008–2009 left without a 
degree by 2010.152 Regulators and student loan advocates will likely 
continue to put pressure on for-profit colleges too. For-profit colleges 
are already contracting and many advocates hope this trend 
continues.153 
A.   Corinthian Colleges 
Advocates against for-profit institutions viewed the Department of 
Education’s (DOE) crackdown on Corinthian Colleges, Inc. for 
student loan fraud as a victory. 154 Corinthian was forced to sell half 
of its college campuses, and it looked as if the schools would be 
closed forever.155 However, some viewed it as a defeat because the 
sale was made possible by a bailout from the DOE.156 The end buyer 
                                                                                                                 
 152. See U.S. SENATE HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSION COMM., FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUC.: THE 
FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT & ENSURE STUDENT SUCCESS 73 (2012), 
http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/for_profit_report/PartI-PartIII-SelectedAppendixes.pdf. 
 153. See, e.g., Libby Nelson, One of the Worst For-Profit College Chains is About to go out of 
Business, VOX (June 24, 2014, 5:30 PM), http://www.vox.com/2014/6/24/5835884/one-of-the-worst-
for-profit-college-chains-is-about-to-go-out-of; Alan Pyke, Federal Crackdown on For-Profit Colleges 
Claims Its First Victory, THINKPROGRESS (June 23, 2014, 4:22 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/education/ 
2014/06/23/3452144/corinthian-colleges-everest-for-profit-college/. 
 154. See Nelson, supra note 153 (“Headquartered in California, Corinthian operates more than 100 
for-profit colleges under three brands: Heald College, Everest (which includes Everest College, Everest 
University and Everest Institutes), and WyoTech.”); Pyke, supra note 153. 
 155. See Nelson, supra note 153; Pyke, supra note 153. 
 156. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. Department of Education Accepts Operating Plan 
from Corinthian Colleges Inc. (July 3, 2014), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-
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of the schools was none other than the Education Management Credit 
Corp (ECMC), a notorious student loan debt collector.157 Because 
ECMC is a non-profit organization, no one was surprised by 
ECMC’s plans to turn the fifty-six Corinthian college campuses it 
bought into non-profit schools through its newly created Zenith 
Education Group.158 
The transition from for-profit to non-profit is essentially a disguise 
for for-profit schools.159 The transition of Corinthian’s fifty-six 
college campuses to ECMC campuses could redefine the for-profit 
industry. If the company can reinvent Corinthian as a non-profit, 
other for-profit colleges may follow this lead. However, this is not a 
new event.160 Transitioning for-profit colleges to non-profit status 
might be the new trend in trying to save an industry with a horrible 
reputation.161 Aside from Corinthian/ECMC, other schools that have 
transitioned include Keiser University, Stevens-Henager College, and 
Remington College.162 Perhaps Grand Canyon University soon 
will.163 If the transitions were successful for these schools, one would 
assume that many other for-profits would follow to see if this trend 
equals new profits. 
Recently, “the public has come to recognize that many for-profit 
colleges have been ripping off taxpayers and ruining students’ 
lives . . . .”164 Now, this is not true for all students who attended these 
                                                                                                                 
education-accepts-operating-plan-corinthian-colleges-inc (stating that the Department of Education and 
Corinthian will work together to establish a reserve fund of 30 million dollars to pay for refunds). 
 157. Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, How Dozens of for-Profit Schools Found an Unlikely Savior: a Debt 
Collector, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/how-
dozens-of-failing-for-profit-schools-found-an-unlikely-savior-a-debt-collector/2014/11/28/c3ea8218-
7411-11e4-a589-1b102c2f81d0_story.html. 
 158. Chelsey Dulaney & Alan Zibel, Corinthian Colleges to Sell Campuses to Zenith Education, 
WALL ST.(Nov. 20, 2014, 2:38 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/corinthian-colleges-to-sell-campuses-
to-zenith-education-1416496244. 
 159. See, e.g., Patricia Cohen, Some Owners of Private Colleges Turn a Tidy Profit by Going 
Nonprofit, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/03/business/some-private-
colleges-turn-a-tidy-profit-by-going-nonprofit.html?_r=0; David Halperin, If a For-Profit College 
Becomes a Non-Profit, Is That Good? Not Necessarily, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 11, 2013, 9:48 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/davidhalperin/if-a-for-profit-college-b_b_2661788.html. 
 160. See Halperin, supra note 159. 
 161. See id. 
 162. See id. 
 163. Cohen, supra note 159. 
 164. See Halperin, supra note 159. 
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schools, yet, in some cases, these success stories have been exploited 
for more gain.165 The vast majority of students who choose to attend 
these schools are buried in debt and worse off for their experiences, 
and the public is starting to realize what is happening.166 
Because of this realization, enrollments have finally begun to 
decline steadily and the once-mighty industry has gone into a 
financial crisis.167 Consequently, a number of these for-profit 
schools, “such as American Career Institute and ATI [Career 
Training Centers,] have abruptly shut down many or all of their 
campuses.”168 Even the largest schools in the for-profit industry, 
including the University of Phoenix, Career Education Corporation, 
Education Management Corporation (EDMC), and Kaplan, have 
been forced to downsize as their revenues have “sharply 
plummeted.”169 This does not even include Corinthian College, 
which, as previously mentioned, was shut down by the DOE for loan 
fraud.170 
B.   The Non-Profit Disguise and the Motivation 
To save themselves, “a small but increasing number of [for-profit] 
schools are pursuing a new survival strategy: transforming their for-
profit institutions into more traditional non-profit [private] schools,” 
                                                                                                                 
 165. See, e.g., Yahoo! Search Results, YAHOO!, http://video.search.yahoo.com (search “For profit 
students in commercials” to find various commercials of for-profit schools using past students). 
 166. See Chris Kirkham, For-Profit Colleges that Bury Students in Debt Face Second Obama 
Crackdown, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 13, 2014, 11:06 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/ 
03/13/for-profit-colleges-obama_n_4961163.html (stating that 13% of students attend for-profit schools, 
but account for 50% of the student loan defaults); Yasmeen Qureshi, Sarah Gross & Lisa Desai, Screw 
U: How For-Profit Colleges Rip You Off, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 13, 2014, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/01/for-profit-college-student-debt (discussing the money the 
schools’ CEOs make); Jane Bennett Clark, The Real Deal on For-Profit Colleges, KIPLINGER (May 
2011), http://www.kiplinger.com/article/college/T012-C000-S002-the-real-deal-on-for-profit-colleges. 
html (discussing that even with their reputation, students are still attracted to them). 
 167. See, e.g., For-Profit Colleges Still Seeing Declines in Enrollment, NBC NEWS (July 25, 2012), 
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/07/25/12949437-for-profit-colleges-still-seeing-declines-in-
enrollment?lite; Rachel Wiseman, Enrollments Plunge at Many For-Profit Colleges, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC. (Aug. 16, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/Enrollments-Plunge-at-Many/128711/. 
 168. Halperin, supra note 159. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See supra notes 154–58 and accompanying text. 
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or at least to appear that way.171 At a recent “annual convention[] 
held in Las Vegas, the industry’s trade association, the [Association 
of Private Sector Colleges and Universities (APSCU)], offered a 
presentation [conducted] by lawyers about just how to make such a 
conversion, as well as the pros and cons of doing so.”172 However, 
“there are potential dangers to the public when one of today’s for-
profit schools becomes a non-profit.”173 There are benefits associated 
with changing to a non-profit institution: 
It is easy to see why some for-profit college owners now 
might want to take their institutions non-profit[:] to escape 
the bad reputation of their sector; to become eligible for 
private, tax-deductible donations and more state grants; to 
enjoy tax-free status; and, perhaps above all, to avoid 
strengthened federal and state regulations aimed at 
preventing for-profit college abuses.174 
1.   Gainful Employment 
Obtaining non-profit status would also allow for-profit schools to 
avoid the Obama administration’s “gainful employment” rule.175 One 
recent federal regulation aimed towards for-profits is the gainful 
employment requirement.176 This regulation aims to prevent for-
profit schools from charging tuition rates above their students’ ability 
to repay their student loans because their debt is higher than the 
wages commensurate with their career training.177 Proponents of this 
plan anticipate that most for-profit school programs would be forced 
                                                                                                                 
 171. Halperin, supra note 159. 
 172. Id.; Neil Lefkowitz & Douglas M. Mancino, Alternatives to For-Profit Status for Participating 
in Title IV Programs, APSCU (June 21, 2012), http://www.republicreport.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/APSCUConventionSession_AlternativestoForProfitStatus.pdf. 
 173. Halperin, supra note 159. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Educ., Obama Administration Announces Final Rules to Protect 
Students from Poor-Performing Career College Programs (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.ed.gov/news/ 
press-releases/obama-administration-announces-final-rules-protect-students-poor-performing-care. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
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to shut down under this regulation, to restructure their tuition, or to 
change their for-profit status.178 
For-profits attempted to block this regulation by filing a lawsuit in 
February 2015.179 The APSCU, on behalf of the for-profit schools, 
filed a motion for summary judgment in the case regarding the 
gainful employment legislation.180 The APSCU argued that the 
gainful employment rule “would penalize for-profit and trade school 
programs for consistently leaving students with overwhelming 
[student loan] debt[s]” and the inability to repay their student federal 
loans.181 The rule requires these institutions to show potential 
students what previous students have earned upon graduation and the 
amount of debt they are going to accumulate.182 
“In the [DOE’s] initial evaluation of compliance with the gainful 
employment rule, two out of eight Stevens-Henager programs, one 
out of two programs at another affiliated school, California College 
San Diego, and all four CollegeAmerica programs failed all three 
prongs of the federal test.”183 Overall, the DOE estimated that over 
1,400 programs would not pass the gainful employment criteria.184 
Since the gainful employment rule survived APSCU’s motion for 
summary judgment, many for-profit schools will likely face 
closures.185 Thus, the reason to change their status from for-profit to 
non-profit becomes obvious. 
The “biggest potential downside” to for-profit schools for 
changing, at least from the perspective of their owners, is that under 
their present status as for-profit they have been making incredible 
amounts of money.186 With the Gainful Employment Rule now in 
                                                                                                                 
 178. Id. 
 179. See, e.g., Press Release, Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs., APSCU Files Motion for 
Summary Judgment in Gainful Employment Regulation Litigation, APSCU (Feb. 6, 2015), 
http://www.apscu.org/news-and-media/press-releases/apscu-files-motion-summary-judgment-gainful-
employment-litigation.cfm. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See Halperin, supra note 159. 
 182. Press Release, supra note 175. 
 183. See Halperin, supra note 159. 
 184. Press Release, supra note 175. 
 185. APSCU v. Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d 176, 181 (D.D.C. 2015). The court refuted every argument 
that the APSCU offered and even referred to some arguments as “absurd.” Id. at 195. 
 186. Halperin, supra note 159. 
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effect, this decision may not be as hard. The money they are making 
comes from the federal government; for-profit schools are almost 
entirely dependent on government cash in the form of federal student 
loan funding.187 Up to “$33 billion a year in federal [student loan] 
funding [feeds] this industry, with many for-profit schools getting [as 
much as] 85-90% of their revenue[s] from taxpayers.”188 Owners and 
other top executives of for-profit schools have been taking home 
millions of taxpayer-generated dollars every year.189 
For example, Jonathan Grayer, former CEO of Kaplan University, 
received $76 million when he resigned in 2008, and Todd Nelson of 
EDMC increased his compensation from less than $2 million in 2009 
to $13 million in 2011, even as EDMC’s value was falling.190 
“University of Phoenix founder John Sperling, who is [also the] 
chairman of the board of the . . . Apollo Group, 
received . . . compensation of $8.6 million in 2009.”191 “Apollo 
Group president[,] Joseph D’Amico, [received] compensation of $5.1 
million.”192 Other executives at Apollo Group earned between $1.6 
and $2.3 million.193 The highest-paid president of a public university 
in the same year was the President of the Ohio State University, who 
earned $1.3 million in total compensation.194 With the Gainful 
Employment rule, it will be interesting to watch these figures and see 
if they fall and by how much. 
There are many examples from other schools too, but note, for-
profit compensation coincides with lawsuits filed against for-profit 
schools for gainful employment because the cost of their programs 
exceed the potential income for their students.195 Thus, these owners 
                                                                                                                 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Emily Hanford, The Case Against For-Profit Colleges and Universities, AM. PUB. MEDIA, 
http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/tomorrows-college/phoenix/case-against-for-profit-
schools.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See, e.g., Kimberly Hefling, For-Profit Programs Face ‘Gainful Employment’ Rule, DENV. POST 
(Oct. 30, 2014, 2:28 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_26828332/profit-colleges-face-
gainful-employment-rule (discussing gainful employment and the effects of that rule). 
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are walking away with millions while many of their students will 
never be able to make enough money to repay the students loans they 
received to get these expensive degrees.196 This does not sound right 
at any level of thinking and is a reason behind the Gainful 
Employment Rule. 
What taxpayers should be concerned about is the prospect of some 
for-profit colleges, whose owners have gotten rich by offering low-
quality degree programs with sky-high prices, becoming tax-exempt 
non-profit charities that are supposed to be serving the public interest 
and avoiding the Gainful Employment Rule.197 The concern is that 
some of these schools may use their newly transformed non-profit 
status to disguise themselves in an attempt to continue selling their 
programs to vulnerable students, which primarily include veterans, 
single mothers, immigrants, and low-income people.198 
2.   Stevens-Henager College 
A school that has recently changed operations is Stevens-Henager 
College and its group of schools, headquartered in Utah.199 The 
school has about 10,000 students both online and on campuses spread 
throughout Utah and Idaho and, as of 2013, offers Associate, 
Bachelor, and Master degrees in business, health care, nursing, 
information technology, graphic arts, and more.200 The school stated 
the switch to non-profit status “was made to allow the college to 
obtain private donations and . . . ’to meet the long-term vision of its 
single shareholder, Carl Barney, who purchased Stevens-Henager’” 
in 1998.201 
                                                                                                                 
 196. See, e.g., Peter S. Goodman, In Hard Times, Lured Into Trade School and Debt, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/14/business/14schools.html. 
 197. Halperin, supra note 159. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE, http://www.stevenshenager.edu (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). 
 200. See Halperin, supra note 159; Stevens-Henager College Programs, STEVENS-HENAGER COLL., 
http://www.stevenshenager.edu/programs, (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). 
 201. Halperin, supra note 159; Stevens-Henager College Becomes A Nonprofit, CAREER COLL. CENT. 
(Jan. 21, 2013), http://careercollegecentral.com/news/stevens-henager-college-becomes-nonprofit. 
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“What kind of school has Stevens-Henager been” in the past?202 
Well, for example, “one of its employees wrote a letter to 
authorities”203 that alleged and initiated a lawsuit204 alleging “a lack 
of standards and integrity in the school’s recruiting” of students and 
in the faculty they employed.205 The letter stated, “admission 
representatives are required to enroll anyone and everyone” and paid 
bonuses for their enrollees.206 The school also allegedly “falsified 
student attendance records and grades” to show compliance with 
their accreditation.207 Lastly, the school allegedly employed faculty 
that were not qualified for their positions.208 
Another example was the school’s director saying, “[g]et 40 
people and I don’t care what you say or do to get them.”209 The 
admissions representatives were directed to enroll anyone and 
everyone regardless of their ability to attend school.210 “Numerous 
[former] students have reported that [Stevens-Henager] only cares 
about making money, not about helping students.”211 
“Stevens-Henager and its affiliated colleges have established 
records of leaving their students deep in debt” and unable to repay 
their student loans.212 For example, the federal government compiled 
                                                                                                                 
 202. See Halperin, supra note 159. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See United States ex rel. Brooks v. Stevens-Henager Coll., Inc., No. 1:13-CV-00009, 2014 WL 
3101817, at *1 (D. Idaho May 8, 2014); see also David Halperin, Colorado Sues CollegeAmerica for 
Systematic Deception, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david 
halperin/colorado-sues-collegeamerica-for-systematic-deception_b_6702612.html (noting that the 
Justice Department charged Stevens-Henager schools with paying “their recruiters bonuses, 
commissions, and other forms of incentive compensation in violation of the federal ban on such 
compensation” as well as “employ[ing] faculty members who lacked the minimum qualifications 
required by the school’s accrediting agency, and that [Stevens-Henager] officials falsified student 
attendance records and grades”). 
 205. David Halperin, Breaking: Justice Dept. Sues For-Profit Stevens-Henager College, HUFFINGTON 
POST (June 9, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/davidhalperin/breaking-justice-dept-sue_b_ 
5120249.html. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See Halperin, supra note 159. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id.; see also Stevens Henegar College Ogden, STUDENTREVIEWS.COM, 
http://www.studentsreview.com/UT/SHC_comments.html?page=1&type=&d_school=Stevens%20Hena
ger%20College%20Ogden (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). 
 212. See Halperin, supra note 159. 
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the following records. In 2010, 29.5% and in 2011, 26.3% of the 
students from the Flagstaff, Arizona, campus of CollegeAmerica 
defaulted on their student loans within three years.213 The default rate 
was 34.8% in 2010 and 25.4% in 2011 at the CollegeAmerica 
campus in Denver.214 At the Stevens-Henager campus in West 
Haven, Utah, it was 33.6% in 2010 and 27.1% in 2011.215 For 
comparison, the default rate at the University of Utah was 3.9% for 
both 2010 and 2011,216 and the University of Arizona was 6.8% in 
2010 and 7.0% in 2011.217 These defaults are partially due to the high 
costs of attendance and the low pay for the graduates that can find 
jobs.218 Stevens-Henager’s own webpage does not display a cost of 
attendance.219 There was no information about costs and to get that 
information, a prospective student must call and speak to an 
admissions representative.220 This is actually a common practice for 
some for-profit websites.221 
In 2011, Carl Barney, the owner of Stevens-Henager, argued that 
the for-profit industry was attacked through “‘ugly slander and 
denunciations by Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) and promoted by some 
in the media,’ because of the greed of Wall Street short-sellers who 
bet against the industry (a familiar claim by for-profit college 
executives); and because the sector is ‘enormously successful’ and 
thus a threat to other colleges.”222 I do not think the University of 
                                                                                                                 
 213. Cohort Default Rates: CollegeAmerica-Flagstaff, AM. COLL. REVIEW, 
http://www.americancollegereview.com/getdetails.php?unitid=103945#fedloans (last visited Mar. 10, 
2016). 
 214. School Default Rates, FED. STUDENT AID, https://www.nslds.ed.gov/nslds/nslds_SA/default 
management/cohortdetail_3yr.cfm?sno=64&ope_id=025943 (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). 
 215. School Default Rates, FED. STUDENT AID, https://www.nslds.ed.gov/nslds/nslds_SA/default 
management/cohortdetail_3yr.cfm?sno=2&ope_id=003674 (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). 
 216. School Default Rates, FED. STUDENT AID, https://www.nslds.ed.gov/nslds/nslds_SA/default 
management/cohortdetail_3yr.cfm?sno=0&ope_id=003675 (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). 
 217. School Default Rates, FED. STUDENT AID, https://www.nslds.ed.gov/nslds/nslds_SA/default 
management/cohortdetail_3yr.cfm?sno=4&ope_id=001083 (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). 
 218. See Qureshi, supra note 166. 
 219. See STEVENS-HENAGER COLLEGE: TUITION FINANCIAL AID, http://www.stevenshenager.edu/ 
tuition-financial-aid (last visited Mar. 17, 2016). 
 220. Id. 
 221. See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX: TUITION AND FEES, http://www.phoenix.edu/tuition_and_ 
financial_options/tuition_and_fees.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). 
 222. See Halperin, supra note 205. 
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Utah or Boise State University are worried about for-profit schools 
threatening their existence. Rather, it is taxpayers that are concerned 
that they are going to have to bailout the for-profit students’ federal 
student loan debt.223 
Another reason Carl Barney gives for attacks of for-profit schools 
is more philosophic in reasoning: 
[T]he most powerful reason. It underlies and ‘justifies’ 
much of the disgraceful, unethical, and criminal activities 
of our adversaries: the Marxist view of profit . . . . There 
are many in Washington and in government colleges and 
universities who are convinced that profit is evil; and, 
therefore, what we do is evil . . . . Their view regarding 
profit as evil is their justification for vilifying us and for 
trying to damage us.224 
Notably, the owner of Stevens-Henager is on the Advisory Board 
for the Clemson Institute for the Study of Capitalism and the board of 
the Ayn Rand Institute.225 How does the conversion of Stevens-
Henager into a non-profit meet the owner’s long-term vision for the 
school, given his strong defense of the profit motive within 
education? 
3.   Other Schools and the 90/10 Rule 
Stevens-Henager is not the only for-profit school to attempt this 
conversion.226 Other for-profit schools, including Keiser 
University227 and Remington College,228 have raised concerns about 
                                                                                                                 
 223. See Halperin, supra note 159. 
 224. Halperin, supra note 205 (quoting Carl Barney). 
 225. Press Release, CollegeAmerica, Carl Barney Appointed to Clemson Institute Advisory Board 
(Sept. 6, 2012) (on file with author). 
 226. See Goldie Blumenstyk, Another College Takes the Path From For-Profit to Nonprofit, THE 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 20, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/Another-College-Takes-the-
Path/126007/; Kelly Field, Keiser U. Goes Nonprofit, THE CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 13, 2011, 
http://chronicle.com/article/Keiser-U-Goes-Nonprofit/125947/. 
 227. See Field, supra note 226 (stating the school was sold to Everglades College Inc., a nonprofit 
entity that operates Everglades University). 
 228. See Blumenstyk, supra note 226 (“Remington has sold itself to a nonprofit entity called 
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the reality of the change in structure.229 The issues include (1) the 
structure of the transaction, (2) the salaries of the new non-profit 
school’s leadership, and (3) disclosure to the public of relevant 
facts.230 The fact that Keiser University apparently remains a member 
of the for-profit college trade association, APSCU, even though it 
became a non-profit in 2011 is an example of this third issue.231 
At the APSCU convention in 2012, the presentation made it clear 
there are regulatory advantages of a for-profit, like Keiser, 
Remington, and Stevens-Henager, selling itself to a non-profit like 
the Center for Excellence in Higher Education and becoming non-
profit.232 A primary inspiration behind this move is to avoid certain 
federal regulations.233 For example, after one year a non-profit school 
is no longer subject to the federal government’s 90/10 rule, which 
requires for-profit schools to obtain at least 10% of their revenues 
from funds outside of the DOE’s financial aid.234 
Many for-profit schools hover over 85%, which is dangerously 
close to the federal government’s 90/10 rule.235 Congress is now 
considering protecting students at for-profit schools even more by 
making this rule tougher.236 If Congress proceeds with this 
regulation, it would increase the challenge posed to for-profit schools 
                                                                                                                 
Remington College Inc.”). 
 229. Id.; Field, supra note 226. 
 230. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, For Profit Colleges and Universities, NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July 3, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/for-
profit-colleges-and-universities.aspx. 
 231. APSCU Member School Listing, APSCU, http://www.career.org/membership/apscu-member-
companies/educational-members/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). 
 232. See Halperin, supra note 159. 
 233. Id. 
 234. See Blumenstyk, supra note 226 (stating that the “U.S. Department of Education has advised 
Remington that it may require the college to continue to adhere to the 90-10 rule for a few years as a 
condition of the conversion”). The owner of Remington stated, “[t]hey do that just to make sure you’re 
not using it as a 90-10 dodge.” Id. 
 235. Kelly Field, Senators Mull Changes in 90/10 Rule to Rein In For-Profits, THE CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC. (March 2, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/Senators-Mull-Changes-to-90-10/126564/. 
 236. Durbin, Harkin: Congress Must Remove Loophole That Encourages For-Profit Colleges To 
Target Veterans, DICK DURBIN UNITED STATES SENATOR ILLINOIS (Jan. 23, 2012), 
http://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin-harkin-congress-must-remove-loophole-
that-encourages-for-profit-colleges-to-target-veterans. 
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in complying with the rule for schools that are heavily dependent on 
federal money.237 
The concern is that 96% of the students who go to for-profit 
schools borrow money to attend.238 By comparison, only 13% of 
students who attend community colleges borrow money.239 At four-
year public schools, the number is 48%, and lastly, 57% at four-year 
private non-profit colleges borrow money to attend.240 
There are several reasons for this disparity of borrowing. First, 
“[t]uition is typically higher at for-profits than at public schools.”241 
This is due, in part, because state taxpayers are paying some of the 
bill, which lowers the tuition price.242 “Private non[-]profit colleges 
often reduce the sticker price for students through scholarships and 
other kinds of institutional aid.”243 This is partially due to alumni 
contributions, which for-profit institutions cannot raise.244 Second, 
students who attend for-profit schools typically have lower incomes 
than students at other kinds of colleges.245 Given these two reasons, 
for-profit student must borrow money to attend.246 This raises an 
ethical point: for-profit schools keep the poor, poor. 
Another ethical point is for-profit schools’ focus on the military. 
Under current regulation, the Post 9/11 GI Bill is included as part of 
the 10% federal funding under the 90/10 rule.247 This does not make 
sense because the GI Bill is also federal funding, but this loophole 
has allowed for-profit schools to use military students as a way to 
help them stay within the 90/10 rules.248 If the proposed change to 
the 90/10 rule is made, then many for-profit schools will be in 
violation of the rule without even having to change the ratio.249 
                                                                                                                 
 237. See id. 
 238. Hanford, supra note 191. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Hanford, supra note 191. 
 245. Id. 
 246. See id. 
 247. 90/10 Rule, FINAID, http://www.finaid.org/loans/90-10-rule.phtml (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). 
 248. See Durbin, supra note 236. 
 249. See 90/10 Rule, supra note 247. 
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Nonetheless, the proposed change would shift the 90/10 ratio to an 
85/15 ratio.250 
The HELP committee, led by Senator Harkin, concluded that 
Keiser University’s concern about its compliance with the 90/10 rule 
“likely played a role in Keiser’s conversion to non-profit status.”251 
Another reason for Keiser’s concern was the expiration of the 
Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act (ECASLA), which 
allowed the school and other for-profit schools an exclusion of some 
federal aid into the 90/10 ratio.252 In addition, the conversion would 
allow non-profit schools more access to grants.253 
III.   THE HISTORY OF OPPOSITION 
Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) is the most prominent opponent of 
for-profit schools.254 The Senator believed that the University of 
Phoenix, the largest for-profit school, erred when it became a 
publically traded company in 1994.255 This move created a profit 
driven atmosphere pressured by Wall Street.256 
Strayer University, one of the oldest for-profit schools, was 
founded in 1892 as a business school.257 A century later, in 1996, it 
established Strayer Education, Inc. and went public to raise capital 
for expansion.258 Both Strayer and Phoenix were among many for-
profit schools making the Wall Street leap in the 1990s.259 
The Wall Street leap allowed these schools to grow at an 
incredible rate.260 Strayer went from about 10,000 students to over 
                                                                                                                 
 250. Id. The rule used to be 85/15 and it was changed to 90/10 in 1998. Id. 
 251. HELP Committee Report, The Keiser School, Inc., HELP COMMITTEE, at 572, 
http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/for_profit_report/PartII/Keiser.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2016). 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. See Hanford, supra note 191. 
 255. See id. 
 256. See id. 
 257. Strayer Education: History, STRAYER EDUCATION, INC., http://www.strayereducation.com/ 
history.cfm (last visited Mar. 11, 2016). 
 258. Id. 
 259. Hanford, supra note 191. 
 260. Id. 
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60,000 in 2010.261 Phoenix grew from 10,000 students to over 
100,000 the first five years it went public, then to an astonishing 
470,000 students at its peak.262 By 2010, 10% of all students were 
attending for-profit schools.263 The move to Wall Street made the 
industry a lot of money in the short term.264 
Another source of opposition has focused on the recruiting 
practices of publicly-traded, for-profit schools.265 As far back as 
1992, in response to evidence that representatives at some for-profit 
colleges were being paid based on how many students they enrolled, 
Congress passed a series of laws that prohibited incentive-based 
compensation at for-profit schools.266 In the early 2000s, in response 
to lobbying efforts by the growing for-profit college industry, the 
Bush Administration added a series of exceptions to the laws, 
allowing some forms of incentive-based pay.267 
Even with those exceptions, former employees at the University of 
Phoenix filed a whistleblower lawsuit in 2003 alleging that Apollo, 
the parent company of the University of Phoenix, violated those 
laws.268 Apollo paid the federal government $78.5 million to settle 
the lawsuit in 2009 without admitting wrongdoing in the case.269 The 
Obama Administration eliminated certain “safe harbors” that 
legalized some forms of incentive compensation.270 Students 
                                                                                                                 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. See id. 
 265. Hanford, supra note 191. 
 266. Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, §§ 487(a), 490(a)(3)(B), 106 Stat. 
448, 625 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a)(20)); see also Kelly Field, Government Scrutinizes Incentive 
Payments for College Recruiters, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 1, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/ 
Government-Scrutinizes/123728/ (stating Congress passed the incentive ban in 1992 as part of a broader 
effort to prevent for-profit schools abusing the federal student aid system). But see 34 C.F.R. 
§ 668.14(b)(22)(ii)(A) (2015) (containing current ban). 
 267. 34 C.F.R. § 668.14(b)(22)(ii) (2009); see also Diane Bartz, Analysis: For-Profit Schools Attack 
Reform Rule by Lobbying, REUTERS (Jan. 12, 2011, 8:57 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/01/12/ 
us-congress-forprofit-idUKTRE70B6T020110112 (containing further analysis into the safe harbors). 
 268. Protect Consumer Justice, University of Phoenix Settles with Whistle Blowers and Feds, 
PROTECT CONSUMER JUSTICE (Dec. 14, 2009), http://www.protectconsumerjustice.org/university-of-
phoenix-settles-with-whistle-blowers-and-feds.html (stating also that the whistleblower received $19 
million and the DOE received $48.5 million). 
 269. Id. 
 270. 34 C.F.R. § 668.14(b)(22)(ii)(B) (2015). 
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attending these schools, incurring student loan debt, and being unable 
to repay their debt has again raised the question of how, as a society, 
to deal with massive student loan debts. 
IV.   THE FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN DEBT AND THE BANKRUPTCY 
COURT’S STANDARD TO DISCHARGE THEM 
Bankruptcy courts are filled with borrowers attempting to 
discharge their student loans under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 of the 
Bankruptcy Code from the issues caused by the for-profit college 
industry.271 Most jurisdictions use the Brunner test272 to determine 
whether a borrower can discharge student loans in bankruptcy.273 The 
Bankruptcy Code states that unless a borrower can show undue 
hardship, student loans cannot be discharged in a bankruptcy 
proceeding.274 Thus, the presumption is that student loans are not 
dischargeable in any bankruptcy proceeding.275 However, because 
the Bankruptcy Code is silent on the definition of undue hardship, 
bankruptcy courts have had to define undue hardship on their own.276 
As previously mentioned, the Brunner test is the most common 
standard employed by courts,277 and courts have interpreted it so 
restrictively that most borrowers believe their federal student loans 
are never dischargeable in bankruptcy.278 However, even with this 
strict standard, some borrowers have had their student loans 
discharged in bankruptcy proceedings.279 The issues arising from the 
                                                                                                                 
 271. See, e.g., In re Oyler, 397 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating the Sixth Circuit adopts the 
Brunner test but as a hybrid ); In re Gerhardt, 348 F.3d 89, 91–92 (5th Cir. 2003); In re Cox, 338 F. 
1238, 1240 (11th Cir. 2003); In re Ekenasi, 325 F.3d 541, 546 (4th Cir. 2003); In re Goulet, 284 F.3d 
773, 777 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Brightful, 267 F.3d 324, 327 (3d Cir. 2001); In re Rhodes, 464 B.R. 918, 
923 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (stating the Ninth Circuit has adopted the Brunner test). 
 272. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In Re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
 273. See, e.g., cases discussed supra note 271. 
 274. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012). 
 275. See In re Kidd, 472 B.R. 857, 861 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2012) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)). 
 276. In re Wolph, 479 B.R. 725, 729 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2012). 
 277. See, e.g., cases discussed supra note 271. 
 278. Betsy Mayotte, Debunking the Student Loan Bankruptcy Myth, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 13, 2014, 10:00 
AM), http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/student-loan-ranger/2014/08/13/debunking-the-student-
loan-bankruptcy-myth. 
 279. Id. 
35
Smith: The Income-Based Repayment Plans
Published by Reading Room, 2016
638 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:3 
amount of federal student loan debt are not going to be resolved 
under the current bankruptcy system regardless of how courts 
interpret the Bankruptcy Code.280 The reason student loan debt 
cannot be resolved by the current bankruptcy system is the growing 
amount of federal student loan debt and the number of borrowers 
who are in default.281 With the increase in student loan debt and the 
emergence of repayment plans such as the IBR, the Brunner test is 
now obsolete.282 
A.   History of the Bankruptcy Code and Treatment of Student Loans 
The beginning of the United States’ Bankruptcy Code is a story of 
reactionary politics.283 Congress passed the first permanent 
Bankruptcy Code in 1898284 due to the financial panic of 1893.285 
The 1898 Code was not the country’s first Bankruptcy Code; there 
had been previous bankruptcy laws passed, but never a permanent 
bankruptcy law.286 Before the passage of the 1898 Code, Congress 
had passed three different Bankruptcy Codes: one in 1800287 in 
reaction to the depression of 1793,288 another in 1841289 in reaction to 
the financial panic of 1837,290 and lastly, one in 1867291 in reaction to 
the financial panic of 1857.292 These Bankruptcy Codes were very 
short because after the Codes corrected the economic situation, 
                                                                                                                 
 280. See Danielle Kurtzleben, 5 Shocking Facts About Student Loan Debt, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 12, 2006, 
12:26 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/03/06/5-shocking-facts-about-student-loan-debt. 
 281. See id. 
 282. Steve Rhode, Brunner Test Needs to Die Say These Heroes in Student Loan Bankruptcy 
Discharge, GETOUTOFDEBT.ORG (Aug. 7, 2015), https://getoutofdebt.org/92785/brunner-test-needs-to-
die-say-these-heroes-in-student-loan-bankruptcy-discharge. 
 283. David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 321, 323 (1999). 
 284. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 14b, 30 Stat. 550 (repealed in 1978). The 1898 Act referred 
to bankruptcy judges as “referees”. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 8 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5969. 
 285. Skeel, supra note 283, at 323. 
 286. See Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch.6, 2 Stat. 248. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Skeel, supra note 283, at 323. 
 289. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614. 
 290. Skeel, supra note 283, at 323. 
 291. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99. 
 292. Skeel, supra note 283, at 323. 
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Congress repealed them.293 However, since the passage of the 
Bankruptcy Code in 1898, the United States has retained the concept 
of bankruptcy and borrowers’ ability to obtain a fresh start.294 This 
history of the various Codes also shows the ability of the Bankruptcy 
Code to improve the American economy.295 
The 1898 Bankruptcy Code treated federal student loans like any 
other unsecured debt.296 It was not until 1978, with the incorporation 
of the “modern” Bankruptcy Code, that the Code separated federal 
student loans from other unsecured debt in their treatment under the 
Code.297 Federal student loans, which were not created until the 
1950s,298 obviously could not have been addressed until the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code was enacted and modernized the bankruptcy 
system.299 Beginning with the Education Amendments of 1976,300 
Congress made it more difficult to discharge federal student loans 
because of perceived abuses in the bankruptcy system by student loan 
                                                                                                                 
 293. Id. 
 294. See Paulette J. Delk, Lien Avoidance Under Section 522(F) of the Bankruptcy Code: The 
Winding Road to the Supreme Court, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 879, 879–81 (1991) (discussing the 
“fresh start” policy of bankruptcy). 
 295. Skeel, supra note 283, at 323. 
 296. See Craig Peyton Gaumer, Chaos in the Courts, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 23, 2004, at 8. 
 297. See B.J. Huey, Comment, Undue Hardship or Undue Burden: Has the Time Finally Arrived for 
Congress to Discharge Section 523(A)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code?, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 89, 99–100 
(2002). After the 1898 Act, Congress attempted to update the 1898 Act, by passing several amendments 
from the 1930s through the 1970s. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the 
United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 30–31 (1995). These Amendments did not make any 
sweeping changes; they typically applied to specific issues only. Id. 
 298. National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580 (1958). At the heart 
of NDEA was the National Defense Student Loan (NDSL) program, which for the first time offered 
federally provided student loans to Americans seeking postsecondary education. Id. Congress revamped 
the NDSL and renamed the program the “Perkins Loan Program” after Rep. Carl Perkins of Kentucky. 
See Higher Education Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-498, 100 Stat. 1268 (1986). 
 299. Darrell Dunham & Ronald A. Buch, Educational Debts Under the Bankruptcy Code, 22 
MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 679, 680 (1992). 
 300. Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 127(a), 90 Stat. 2081, 2141 (repealed 
1978) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976)). The provision reads in pertinent part: 
Five-year nondischargeability of certain loan debts . . . . A debt which is a loan 
insured or guaranteed under the authority of this part may be released by a 
discharge in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act only if such discharge is 
granted after the five-year period . . . beginning on the date of commencement of 
the repayment period of such loan, except that prior to the expiration of the five 
year-period, such loan may be released only . . . [if it] will impose an undue 
hardship on the debtor or his dependents. 
Id. Congress repealed 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 when it passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Id. 
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borrowers.301 This perception grew as federal student loan spending 
increased dramatically in the 1970s, and many began to see the 
borrower’s ability to discharge the federal student loans as a possible 
abuse that could be taken advantage of by student borrowers.302 
Because of these concerns, Congress established a Commission on 
the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States in 1970.303 Three years 
later, the Commission issued a report304 that suggested bankruptcy 
reform and drafted a bill.305 The report was separated into two 
parts.306 Part one contained the findings and recommendations of the 
Commission.307 Part two consisted of the proposed changes to the 
Bankruptcy Code.308 This extensive study of the United States’ 
economy and bankruptcy’s role in the economy resulted in the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which was signed by President 
Carter on November 6, 1978, and took effect on October 1, 1979.309 
The few stories of recent college graduates who obtained 
discharges of their federal student loans, without even attempting 
repayment, served as the catalyst for the changes that Congress and 
the Commission proposed and enacted.310 Publicized stories of 
doctors and lawyers who abused the federal student loan discharge 
provision added to Congressional concerns that borrowers were 
                                                                                                                 
 301. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1232, at 13 (1976). 
 302. See, e.g., Peter B. Barlow, Nondischargeability of Educational Debts Under Section 523(A)(8) of 
the Bankruptcy Code; Equitable Treatment of Cosigners and Guarantors?, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 481, 483 
(1995). 
 303. S.J. RES. 88, 91st Cong., Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 1 
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787. The Commission became operational in June 1971. Id. 
 304. H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137 (1973). 
 305. H.R. 10792, 93rd Cong. (1973); S. 2565, 93rd Cong. (1973). Many of the recommendations of 
the Commission stemmed from recommendations made by the Brookings Institute’s study that 
concluded in 1971. DAVID A. SKEEL, JR, DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN 
AMERICA 143 (2001). 
 306. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 1. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. at 2. 
 309. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (effective Oct. 1, 1979) (codified as amended at 11 
U.S.C. §§ et seq. (2000)). For a general discussion of the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978, see H.R. REP. NO. 595, 95th Cong. (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 5963, 5963–65. For a complete history of the Act including the documents, see generally 
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (Alan N. Resnick & Eugene M. 
Wypyski eds., 1979). 
 310. H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 176 (1973). 
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intentionally exploiting the federal student loan program to get a free 
education.311 However, during this time, Congress disregarded 
empirical evidence from a General Accounting Office study that 
found that less than one percent of all federally insured and 
guaranteed student loans were discharged in bankruptcy. Simply put, 
the discharge of federal student loans in bankruptcy proceeding was 
too minor to threaten the economic viability of the student-loan 
program.312 However, since that time, more borrowers are taking 
more money each year.313 Thus, Congress wanted to make sure that 
borrowers would not abuse the system.314 Some members of 
Congress even worried that if federal student loans continued to be 
treated like other unsecured debts during bankruptcy, it could 
threaten the existence of the entire federal student loan program.315 
In 1976, because of the growing reliance on federal student loans 
and Congressional concerns, Congress included Section 523(a)(8)(A) 
in the Bankruptcy Code.316 Section 523(a)(8)(A) required the 
borrowers to show undue hardship before they could be 
discharged.317 Furthermore, it prohibited the discharge of federal 
student loans under Chapter 7 petitions unless the student loans 
became due at least five years before the filing of the petition, unless 
the borrower could prove undue hardship.318 These provisions were 
                                                                                                                 
 311. See Robert F. Salvin, Student Loans, Bankruptcy and the Fresh Start Policy: Must Doctors be 
Impoverished to Discharge Educational Loans?, 71 TUL. L. REV. 139, 145 (1996). 
 312. Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship 
Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. LJ. 179, 181 (2009). 
 313. Emily Driscoll, The Student Loan Debt Crisis: Welcome to the $1 Trillion Club, FOX BUSINESS 
(Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2013/01/02/student-loan-debt-crisis-
welcome-to-1-trillion-club/ (discussing the rate that borrowers are increasingly borrowing student 
loans). 
 314. H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 176. 
 315. See, e.g., H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 141 (warning that the federal student loan program’s 
integrity was at stake); 124 CONG. REC. H1791 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1978) (statement of Rep. Ertel): see 
also In re Lohman, 79 B.R. 576, 580 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1987) (stating that prior to 1976, courts presumed 
federal student loan discharge). 
 316. Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 127(a), 90 Stat. 2081, 2141 (codified as 
amended in scattered section of 20 U.S.C.) (repealed in 1978). 
 317. Id. 
 318. See H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 174, pt. 2, at 136 (containing the Commission’s proposal for 
borrowers to wait five years into repayment before being able to file for bankruptcy on their student 
loans). 
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included in the modern Bankruptcy Code enacted in 1978.319 Twelve 
years later, in 1990, Congress updated the Bankruptcy Code again to 
lengthen the five-year waiting period to seven years unless, as before, 
the borrower could prove undue hardship.320 In addition, this same 
time requirement and undue hardship standard was expanded to 
include Chapter 13 petitions.321 
Even with these significant changes, Congress was convinced that 
abusive filings were still occurring and that they would only get 
worse.322 Thus, the Bankruptcy Code was again amended in 1998.323 
The 1998 amendment removed the time component altogether and 
left only the undue hardship provision as the sole means of 
discharging federal student loans.324 The last significant change to the 
Bankruptcy Code occurred in 2005.325 Congress, under pressure from 
special interest groups, changed the definition of student loans 
covered under § 523(a)(8) to include private loans, thus making any 
student loan, federal or not, essentially non-dischargeable in 
bankruptcy.326 To have federal student loans discharged in a 
bankruptcy proceeding the borrower must show “undue hardship.”327 
Courts interpret undue hardship as a very high standard to meet.328 
The Bankruptcy Code still does not define undue hardship, and the 
courts have developed a variety of unpredictable tests for the undue 
hardship standard to determine whether a borrower qualifies for 
discharge.329 The most common test is discussed below.330 
                                                                                                                 
 319. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 523(a)(8), 92 Stat. 2549, 2591 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(8) (2000)). 
 320. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789. 
 321. Id.; see also Carolyn J. Wilson, Administrative Law and Procedure–Student Loan Discharges 
Under Chapter 13 Bankruptcy and Ripeness for Adjudication–Educational Credit Management 
Corporation v. Coleman (In re Coleman), 15 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 165, 168–70 (2010) 
(discussing the difficulty courts had in applying the Brunner test that was originally used for Chapter 7 
petitions being used for Chapter 13 petitions now). 
 322. See Salvin supra note 311, at 180. 
 323. Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 Stat. 1832. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 
Stat. 23. 
 326. Id. 
 327. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012). 
 328. See infra Part V.B. 
 329. See Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An 
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B.   The Brunner Test331 
The Brunner test is a three-prong test requiring borrowers to show 
that there is practically no way they could ever repay their federal 
student loans in order to have them discharged.332 Borrowers must 
pass, or prove, all three prongs of the Brunner test to have their 
student loans discharged.333 If a borrower fails to prove undue 
hardship on any prong, then the inquiry stops.334 The borrower must 
prove each prong of the Brunner test by a preponderance of the 
evidence.335 However, because this is a judicial rule, courts interpret 
the rule differently to determine the existence of undue hardship.336 
Nonetheless, most bankruptcy courts have chosen to interpret the 
Brunner test quite narrowly.337 The following sections describe how 
courts have interpreted undue hardship.338 
1.   The First Prong 
The first prong of the Brunner test states that borrowers must show 
that if they were to pay their federal student loans, they would not be 
able to maintain a minimal standard of living.339 “[T]his prong of 
                                                                                                                 
Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 486–91 (2005) 
(discussing the various tests courts have used). 
 330. See infra, Part V.B. 
 331. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In Re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
 332. See Dunham & Buch, supra note 299, at 702 n.127 (stating that regardless of which undue 
hardship test is used, most courts find that borrower has not established undue hardship, and these courts 
list Brunner as support). 
 333. See, e.g., In re Frushour, 433 F.3d 393, 400 (4th Cir. 2005); In re O’Neal, 390 B.R. 821, 824 
(Bankr. D.S.C. 2008). 
 334. In re Kidd, 472 B.R. 857, 862 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2012). 
 335. See, e.g., In re Lilly, No. 09-02666-LT7, 2013 WL 489019, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 
2013); In re Malone, 469 B.R. 768, 773 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2012). 
 336. See, e.g., Terrence L. Michael & Janie M. Phelps, “Judges?!—We Don’t Need No Stinking 
Judges!!!”: The Discharge of Student Loans in Bankruptcy Cases and The Income Contingent 
Repayment Plan, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 73, 91 (2005). 
 337. See In re Mosley, 330 B.R. 832, 841 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005) (stating that “the Brunner test is 
often strictly interpreted” resulting in denial of discharge for borrowers who are truly deserving and thus 
not complying with fresh start policy and goal of the Bankruptcy Code); In re Speer, 272 B.R. 186, 193 
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2001) (describing Brunner test as making “it as tough as humanly possible to 
discharge a student loan”). 
 338. See infra Part IV.B. sec. 1–3. 
 339. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In Re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d 
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Brunner contemplates an evaluation of the present impact” that the 
repayment of the federal student loan “has upon the standard of 
living of the [borrower] and the [borrower’s] dependents,” while 
considering the borrower’s “current income and expenses.”340 In the 
2012 case Braun v. Sallie Mae (In re Braun), the Department of 
Education (DOE) argued that the borrower could maintain a minimal 
standard of living because the borrower was eligible for alternative 
repayment plans and under either plan the required payment would 
be zero.341 This argument is becoming more common with the 
addition or the various repayment plans available to borrowers.342 
While the effect may be the same, an alternative repayment plan’s 
payment, if zero, does not compare with a deferment or forbearance 
of the borrower’s federal student loans, where the loans are not in 
repayment status and no monthly payment of any amount is even 
calculated. With most repayment plans, the actual amount owed by 
the borrower increases over the time they are making their 
payments.343 Thus, if the DOE’s argument becomes precedent, no 
borrowers would ever qualify for a discharge of their federal student 
loans. If that were the intention of Congress in 2005, they would have 
removed the undue hardship provision entirely from the Bankruptcy 
Code.344 Congress did not remove it, so the DOE’s argument must 
fail. As a result, federal student loans are considered as a part of the 
borrower’s entire debt in consideration of their bankruptcy petition. 
Therefore, borrowers are back to the Brunner test’s original 
inquiry. If borrowers can show that they cannot maintain the minimal 
standard of living, then they have shown that an undue hardship may 
                                                                                                                 
Cir. 1987). 
 340. In re Greene, 484 B.R. 98, 115 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012). 
 341. In re Braun, No. 1.10-BK-1169-GM, 2012 WL 5199163, at *6–8. (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 19, 
2012). 
 342. See, e.g., In re Grove, 323 B.R. 216, 229 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005); In re Durrani, 311 B.R. 496, 
507 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004). 
 343. See Philip G. Schrag, Federal Student Loan Repayment Assistance for Public Interest Lawyers 
and Other Employees of Governments and Nonprofit Organizations, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 27, 36–38 
(2007) (discussing the impact of alternative repayment plans). 
 344. See Kyle L. Grant, Note, Student Loans in Bankruptcy and the “Undue Hardship” Exception: 
Who Should Foot The Bill?, 2011 BYU L. REV. 819, 829 (2011) (stating that not only did Congress not 
remove the undue hardship clause but expanded it). 
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exist.345 With the inception of the IBR and similar repayment plans, 
does this prong of the Brunner test become obsolete? Does that mean 
if a borrower can qualify for a zero-dollar-a-month repayment plan, 
the first prong of the Brunner test automatically becomes a question 
of the borrower’s general state and not just her federal student loans? 
If the borrower is able to file for bankruptcy protection, and he 
qualifies for zero monthly payments on his federal student loans, then 
one should logically assume the first prong of the Brunner test is 
satisfied and thus obsolete. The IBR is taking us in this direction.346 
However, this is only the first prong of the Brunner test. Even if 
the borrower passes the first prong of the Brunner test, they still must 
pass the other two prongs.347 The first prong has been very difficult 
to satisfy, but with the passage of the IBR, courts need to change 
their stance on this prong significantly in light of the IBR’s impact on 
federal student loan repayments. 
Healey v. Mass. Higher Educ. (In re Healey) is one example 
demonstrating the need for the IBR and its effect on the first prong of 
the Brunner test.348. In In re Healey, the borrower was denied undue 
hardship based upon the first prong of the Brunner test because, 
although she could not maintain the minimal standard of living, she 
did not demonstrate that she was “making a strenuous effort to 
maximize her personal income within the practical limitations of her 
vocational profile.”349 The Eastern District of Michigan also stated 
the lower bankruptcy court erred by not requiring the borrower to 
quit her job as a school teacher and find a higher paying job like the 
one she had before.350 In fact, the court even stated she really did not 
                                                                                                                 
 345. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In Re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d 
Cir. 1987). 
 346. See Brief of for Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. & Nat’l Ass’n of Consumer Bankr. Attorneys as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 8–23, In re Murphy, No. 14-1691 (1st Cir. July 29, 2015), 
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/bankruptcy/brief-murphy-1st-cir-amicus.pdf. 
 347. See, e.g., In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1993); In re Lehman, 226 B.R. 805, 808 
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1998); Robert C. Cloud, When Does Repaying a Student Loan Become an Undue 
hardship?, 185 ED. L. REP. 783, 795 (2004). 
 348. In re Healey, 161 B.R. 389, 395 (E.D. Mich. 1993). 
 349. Id. at 394 (citing North Dakota State Board of Higher Educ. v. French, 62 B.R. 235, 241 (Bankr. 
D. Minn. 1986)). 
 350. Id. 
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work a forty-hour per week job because she had paid holidays.351 
This is one example of how absurd a court can be in determining the 
“minimal standard of living” prong of the Brunner test. Now that the 
IBR payment structures state the borrower may be able to have a 
payment of zero, is it time to declare the first prong of the Brunner 
test obsolete? 
2.   The Second Prong 
The ways in which courts have determined cases under the second 
prong of the Brunner test are equally shocking.352 This prong of the 
Brunner test is forward-looking.353 Therefore, courts must look into 
the borrower’s future, which is the significant portion of the loan 
repayment period, to see if the borrower will be able to repay his 
federal student loans.354 The second prong of the Brunner test “is 
intended to effect the ‘clear congressional intent exhibited in [11 
U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)] to make the discharge of [federal] student loans 
more difficult than that of other nonexcepted debt.’”355 Because of 
this intent, the borrower must “demonstrate insurmountable barriers” 
to her ability to pay their federal student loans in the future.356 
One example of how the bankruptcy courts are forward-looking is 
the case Standfuss v. United Stated Department of Education (In re 
Standfuss).357 In In re Standfuss, the court determined that it was 
unlikely that the borrowers’ income would increase substantially over 
the repayment period of their federal student loans.358 However, there 
was evidence and testimony to support the court’s finding that the 
                                                                                                                 
 351. Id. at 394 n.7. 
 352. See, e.g., In re Davis, 373 B.R. 241, 250 (W.D.N.Y. 2007) (providing a list of possible reasons 
that would allow the borrower to satisfy the second prong of the Brunner test); In re Nys, 308 B.R. 436, 
446–47 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) (providing a more detailed list including cases that were determined 
using the Brunner test). 
 353. See, e.g., In re Greene 484 B.R. 98, 115 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012) (stating the ICP should be 
considered in this forward-looking prong); In re Mayer, 198 B.R. 116, 127 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) 
(stating the court must look more than five years into the future). 
 354. In re Rifino, 245 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001). This prong implies a “certainty of 
hopelessness” on the debtor’s part. In re Wallace, 443 B.R. 781, 789 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010). 
 355. In re Rifino, 245 F.3d at 1088–89 (quoting In re Pena, 155 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
 356. In re Nys, 308 B.R. at 444. 
 357. In re Standfuss, 245 B.R. 356 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2000). 
 358. Id. at 361. 
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borrowers’ expenses would decrease in the future.359 The decrease 
was caused by the fact that two of the borrower’s dependents would 
reach the age of majority within five years of the hearing.360 Thus, 
being forward-looking, the bankruptcy court found no undue 
hardship because the repayment period for the student loan was 
twenty-five years, the borrower’s IBR plan was flexible, and the 
borrower’s expenses would reduce in the next five years netting a 
positive effect on the borrowers’ ability to repay their student 
loans.361 The court did not consider possible increases in expenses or 
new expenses that could arise in the future.362 
What that particular court, and others, seem to overlook is the 
possibility of borrowers incurring new expenses.363 It is easy for a 
court to conclude that a child is reaching the age of majority, but it is 
much more difficult to accept the reality that possible events could 
happen that would cause the borrower to take care of that child as an 
adult. The nature of this approach by the courts shows that the second 
prong of the Brunner test needs to be changed. How can anyone 
expect to predict events twenty to twenty-five years into the future? 
Furthermore, if courts are expected to predict events, should they just 
predict events that possibly improve the borrower’s position or 
should courts also take into account what possible events could occur 
that could worsen the borrower’s position? The only consideration 
should be whether current conditions prohibit borrowers from 
repaying their federal student loans.364 
In addition, because courts take into account future predictions to 
determine possible discharge, how do courts take into account the 
                                                                                                                 
 359. Id. 
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. 
 362. See id. 
 363. See, e.g., In re Douglas, 366 B.R. 241, 255–56 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2007) (discussing in detail how 
courts interpret the second prong of the Brunner test and never mentions any additional expenses 
occurring in the future for the borrower). There are hundreds of cases that are similar to Douglas, but 
none address a borrower’s additional expenses in the future. 
 364. See, e.g., Abbye Atkinson, Race, Education Loans & Bankruptcy, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 23 
(2010); Salvin, supra note 311, at 196; see also Seth J. Gerson, Separate Classification of Student Loans 
in Chapter 13, 73 WASH. U.L.Q. 269, 290–91 (1995) (arguing for federal student loans to be included in 
Chapter 13 payment structure like other unsecured debts). 
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IBR and other repayment plans into their predictions of the future? 
The fact that the required payments on the borrower’s federal student 
loans may change under any alternative repayment plan are certain in 
the future, and thus should be logically evaluated in the forward-
looking second prong of the Brunner test.365 For example, one district 
court remanded a case back to the bankruptcy court to determine the 
impact that the ICR would have on the borrower’s ability to pay her 
student loans in the future.366 Any court’s evaluation should include 
an equal assessment of the borrower’s future ability to repay his 
federal student loans. In any case, with the IBR, the second prong of 
the Brunner test essentially becomes obsolete. However, there is still 
one last prong for the borrower to satisfy.367 
3.   The Third Prong 
The third prong of the Brunner test is the “good faith” 
requirement.368 A significant portion of the good faith requirement is 
for the borrower to show the borrower has made some effort in 
repaying federal student loans and to what extent the borrower has 
made efforts to repay.369 Under this prong courts look to see if 
borrowers have tried alternative repayment plans before asking for 
their federal student loans to be discharged in bankruptcy.370 A 
borrower’s failure to use either the IRC or IBR plans is not a “per se” 
showing of lack of good faith, but is probative of the borrower’s 
intent to repay her student loans.371 In Pennsylvania Higher 
                                                                                                                 
 365. In re Greene, 484 B.R. 98, 115 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012). 
 366. In re Wallace, 259 B.R. 170, 182 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 
 367. See infra Part IV.B. sec. 3. 
 368. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In Re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d 
Cir. 1987). 
 369. See, e.g., In re Roberts, 442 B.R. 116, 120 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010) (citing In re Cekic-Torres, 
431 B.R. 785, 794 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010)); In re Gibson, 428 B.R. 385, 391 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 
2010) (stating the court was “particularly moved by the fact she has not made any payments” on her 
student loans). 
 370. See, e.g., In re Tirch, 409 F.3d 677, 682 (6th Cir. 2005); In re Greene, 484 B.R. at 113 (stating 
that a borrower participating in the ICR plan is “relevant to much of the analysis conducted by a 
bankruptcy court to determine if undue hardship exists”). 
 371. In re Tirch, 409 F.3d at 682; In re Branch, No.09-31844-sgj-7, 2010 WL 817395, at *2 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2010) (stating the borrower’s “failure to apply for an income-based repayment 
plan . . . evidences a lack of good faith in repaying his student loan”). 
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Education Assistance Agency v. Birrane (In re Birrane),372 the court 
found no good faith on the borrower’s part when he failed to pursue 
an alternative payment plan once it became available.373 Moreover, in 
Educational Credit Management Corp. v. Mason (In re Mason),374 
the court stated the borrower failed to show good faith in repaying his 
student loans because he did not pursue an alternative repayment plan 
with “diligence.”375 Thus, courts will look at the borrower’s efforts to 
use an alternative repayment plan and look at the borrower with 
disfavor if one is not used.376 
Over the years, new repayment plans have become available for 
borrowers to lower their student loan payments.377 Most courts, as 
referenced above, have denied the discharge of student loans if the 
borrower had not tried to use one of these repayment plan options 
before petitioning the court.378 
In Barrett v. Education Credit Management Corporation (In re 
Barrett), however, the court explained that a borrower’s failure to 
participate in an alternative repayment plan—the IBR was not in 
existence then—is not a per se indication of lack of good faith.379 If 
Congress intended to require borrowers’ participation in an 
alternative repayment plan it could have done so when the 
Bankruptcy Code was changed in 2005.380 The court further 
explained that enrollment in an alternative repayment plan has 
potential negative consequences for the borrower.381 First, the court 
acknowledged that the borrower will have the student loans for 
                                                                                                                 
 372. In re Birrane, 287 B.R. 490 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002). 
 373. Id. at 500. 
 374. In re Mason, 464 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 375. Id. at 885. 
 376. See id. 
 377. See supra Part I. 
 378. See In re Birrane, 287 B.R. at 500; In re Mason, 464 F.3d at 885. But see In re Thomsen, 234 
B.R. 506, 514 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1999) (granting the discharge of the borrower’s student loans even with 
a zero payment under a ICR payment plan because the borrowers “would simply exchange one huge 
nondischargeable debt for educational loans for another in the form of nondischargeable income taxes”). 
 379. In Re Barrett, 487 F.3d 353, 364 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 380. Id.; see also Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amendments to 11 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. (2012)). 
 381. In Re Barrett, 487 F.3d at 364. 
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twenty-five years.382 Because the IRC plan passed in 1994,383 no 
borrower had reached that twenty-five year plateau by 2005.384 The 
first borrowers will reach the twenty-five year plateau in 2019.385 
Nonetheless, at the end of the twenty-five years—or twenty years 
with the ICR or IBR plan—if the borrower has been unable to repay 
all the student loans, then the remaining student loan debt is 
cancelled and treated as taxable income.386 Again, no borrower has 
reached the twenty-five year mark.387 Therefore, what Congress and 
the President will do as that date approaches is yet to be 
determined.388 After finding that the borrower had established a 
present and future inability to pay his federal student loan debt, the 
court concluded that the borrower’s decision not to enroll in the ICR 
plan was not a per se indication of bad faith due, in part, to the 
possibly significant tax consequences.389 
The court’s approach makes sense under the good faith 
requirement of the Brunner test. If a borrower has not attempted to 
lower her payments before petitioning the court, judges could 
interpret that as not using every effort to try to repay her student 
loans.390 Furthermore, it does not help the borrower’s position if, 
under one of these repayment plans, the payments are zero.391 Courts 
must also consider the future tax consequences. As a result, under the 
Brunner test, courts have allowed the discharge of student loans 
where a borrower’s monthly payments were zero.392 Again, the IBR 
has changed things. 
                                                                                                                 
 382. Id. 
 383. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(b)(9)(A) (2012). 
 384. See id. 
 385. See id. 
 386. In re Barrett, 487 F.3d at 364. 
 387. See supra notes 383–85 and accompanying text. 
 388. See Betsy Mayotte, 4 Must-Know Facts About Obama’s New Student Loan Plan, US NEWS (June 
11, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/student-loan-ranger/2014/06/11/4-must-
know-facts-about-obamas-new-student-loan-plan. 
 389. In re Barrett, 487 F.3d at 364–65. 
 390. In re Mason, 464 F.3d 878, 885 (9th Cir. 2006); In re Birrane, 287 B.R. 490, 500 (B.A.P. 9th 
Cir. 2002). 
 391. See, e.g., In re Krieger, No. 11-80144, 2012 WL 1155687, at *19 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 2012). 
 392. See, e.g., In re Rutherford, 317 B.R. 865, 881 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2004) (using the future tax 
consequences of a possible zero monthly payment to show undue hardship). 
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V.   THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS IN BANKRUPTCY 
Bankruptcy courts are going to have to address three questions.393 
First, whether zero dollar monthly payments under the IBR 
repayment plan are evidence that a borrower cannot maintain a 
minimum standard of living, as required by the Brunner test.394 If the 
inability to maintain a minimum standard of living is likely to persist, 
does this allow the discharge of federal student loans?395 Moreover, 
does the fact that borrowers are attempting to repay their student 
loans, even though their payments are zero dollars each month, 
constitute a good faith effort to repay their loans and make the 
Brunner test obsolete?396 Second, with the amount of a borrower’s 
federal student loans increasing under these repayment plans, does 
this not reduce a borrower’s ability to pay his loans in the future?397 
Third, with the IBR in effect, is this the first step in allowing 
discharge of federal student loans in bankruptcy?398 
A.   IBR and the Three Prongs of the Brunner Test 
With the incorporation of the IBR, does that eliminate the question 
of undue hardship if the borrower can obtain a zero dollar monthly 
payment? Courts have struggled with this question since the 
beginning of the IBR and the other repayment plans.399 The 
                                                                                                                 
 393. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In Re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d 
Cir. 1987); Craig Andresen, Student Loans: Two Appeals Court Cases Question the Brunner Test, 
BANKR. L. NETWORK (May 11, 2013), http://www.bankruptcylawnetwork.com/student-loans-two-
appeals-court-cases-question-the-brunner-test/. 
 394. Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396. 
 395. Id. 
 396. Id.; In re Krieger, 2012 WL 1155687 at *19. 
 397. See Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396. 
 398. See Joshua Cohen, What Happens to Your Student Loans When you File Bankruptcy, STUDENT 
LOAN LAW. (May 6, 2014), http://thestudentloanlawyer.com/703/what-happens-to-your-student-loans-
when-you-file-bankruptcy/. 
 399. See generally Lelia B. Helms & James D. Jorgensen, Recent Developments In Postsecondary 
Education Law: 2009, 260 ED. L. REP. 493, 500–01 (2010); Jonathan M. Layman, Note, Forgiven But 
Not Forgotten: Taxation Of Forgiven Student Loans Under The Income-Based-Repayment Plan, 39 
CAP. U.L. REV. 131, 153–54 (2011); Robert B. Milligan, Comment, Putting An End To Judicial 
Lawmaking: Abolishing The Undue Hardship Exception For Student Loans In Bankruptcy, 34 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 221, 260 (2000). 
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Bankruptcy Code still contains the undue hardship provision,400 but is 
that going to be interpreted the same in regards to the Brunner test 
and the IBR? Logically, one could ascertain that if the borrower’s 
payment is zero then she could maintain a minimal standard of living 
under the first prong of the Brunner test. Does the Brunner test fail, 
however, in this instance because no borrower would ever qualify for 
undue hardship? If Congress wanted to eliminate the undue hardship 
provision, it could have in 2005 with the last major changes to the 
Bankruptcy Code.401 Thus, this prong of the Brunner test is obsolete 
with the passage of the IBR. 
The second prong of the Brunner test is forward looking.402 Under 
the IBR, if the amount owed increases every year—and borrowers 
face tax consequences for any amount forgiven—does that present a 
case that their situation could be worse? If this is a common result, 
then the second prong of the Brunner test is obsolete as applied to 
federal student loans.403 
Lastly, the third prong of the Brunner test is obsolete. Because the 
IBR allows for monthly payments of zero for an indefinite term, the 
good faith effort requirement is instantly satisfied.404 
B.   Out-of-Control Federal Student Loan Debt 
For now, the IBR co-exists with the undue hardship provision of 
the Bankruptcy Code.405 Furthermore, the concept of treating federal 
student loans differently than other types of unsecured debt still 
exists.406 This is temporary, however, because eventually borrowers 
will not be able to repay their loans.407 When this occurs, the United 
                                                                                                                 
 400. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 220, 
119 Stat. 23, 59; 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(d)(1)(E). 
 401. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act § 220. 
 402. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In Re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d 
Cir. 1987). 
 403. See id. 
 404. Layman, supra note 399, at 137, 153. 
 405. Cohen, supra note 398. 
 406. Adam Levitin, The Examiners: Discharge Private Student Loans, But Federal Loans Have 
Safety Net, WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2015, 12:04 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2015/05/11/the-
examiners-discharge-private-student-loans-but-federal-loans-have-safety-net/. 
 407. See Kelly Field, Government Vastly Undercounts Defaults, THE CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 11, 
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States is going to have to decide how to use federal student loans in 
the future. If federal student loans are to be included in bankruptcy 
like any other unsecured debt, then the federal government will need 
to restructure the entire federal student loan program including how 
much to provide to the student borrowers.408 
The federal student loan debt problem is not unlike other financial 
issues in the American economy. The recent mortgage crisis signaled 
that some issues need special attention from the federal 
government.409 The federal student loan dilemma will need the 
special attention because of the federal government’s rules on the 
discharge of those loans.410 Some economists suggest that the 
existing student loan debt has hindered recovery from the mortgage 
crisis.411 
Student loan debt has a large impact on a borrower’s credit 
report.412 The amount of a borrower’s debt can affect her ability to 
qualify for other loans.413 Furthermore, the federal student loan debt 
can also influence interest rates for these other loans.414 Thus, 
existing student loan debt is influencing the ability for the American 
economy to recover and will be the catalyst for a future economic 
crisis.415 
                                                                                                                 
2010), http://chronicle.com/article/Many-More-Students-Are/66223/ (discussing the actual default rate 
being reported is much higher due to the reporting methods of colleges); see also supra Part I.A 
(discussing the student loan debt). 
 408. Shahien Nasiripour, Obama to Announce Student Loan Reforms as Education Department Stalls, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 10, 2015, 8:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/10/obama-
student-loans-rights_n_6835922.html. 
 409. See Kimberly Amadeo, Could the Mortgage Crisis and Bank Bailout Have Been Prevented?, 
ABOUT.COM (Mar. 13, 2015), http://useconomy.about.com/od/criticalssues/a/prevent_crisis.htm 
(discussing what the government could have done to prevent the collapse); Polyana da Costa & 
Crissinda Ponder, Financial Crisis Timeline: Collapse and Bailout, BANKRATE.COM, 
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/federal-reserve/financial-crisis-timeline.aspx (last visited Mar. 11, 
2016) (providing the bailout timeline); Ryan Guina, The 2008–2009 Financial Crisis—Causes and 
Effects, CASHMONEYLIFE, http://cashmoneylife.com/economic-financial-crisis-2008-causes/ (last 
updated Dec. 29, 2011) (discussing the causes of the mortgage collapse). 
 410. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012). 
 411. Robert Dietz, The Connection Between Student Loans and Housing, NAT’L ASS’N HOME 
BUILDERS (June 21, 2012), http://eyeonhousing.wordpress.com/2012/06/21/student-loans-and-housing/. 
 412. See Cappel, supra note 45. 
 413. See Dietz, supra note 411. 
 414. See Credit Scores, FINAID, http://www.finaid.org/loans/creditscores.phtml (last visited Mar. 11, 
2016) (discussing the impact various items have on the borrower’s credit score). 
 415. See, e.g., Could $1T Student Loan Debt Derail U.S. Recovery?, CBS THIS MORNING (Apr. 4, 
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C.   Bankruptcy Discharge in the Future? 
By developing different student loan repayment plans, the federal 
government is acknowledging there is a severe problem that exists in 
the American economy with the federal student loan debt that 
currently rests on a large segment of the American population’s 
shoulders. Rather than addressing it directly, the government has 
delayed the issue for a future administration and Congress to address 
by passing various alternative repayment plans. At what point will 
the government and the American public say that there is a need for 
more changes to the Bankruptcy Code to address the issue of student 
loan discharge? More importantly, when will Congress create an 
alternative repayment plan that will accomplish a pseudo-bankruptcy 
by allowing borrowers that cannot repay their student loans a method 
of living? This Article argues that the IBR is the foundation of such a 
method. 
The IBR provides that if your income is under a certain amount for 
twenty years and you are not able to repay the entirety of your 
student loans, the federal government will forgive the remainder of 
your federal student loan debt.416 This is a middle-of-the-road 
solution to the federal student loan issue. The IBR does not grant an 
easy exit to borrowers that cannot repay their students loans, but does 
allow a method to get out from under the debt if necessary. 
Under this repayment plan, it is much easier to obtain a payment of 
‘zero’ than the previous repayment plans offered by the federal 
government.417 Even if a borrower must pay a little over zero, a 
substantial percentage of their federal student loans will be forgiven 
at the end of the twenty years, and that does not include the interest 
that would be forgiven.418 The first borrower achieving that twenty-
year period of repayments is still over fifteen years away, but the 
trend of the government repayment plans is to allow for a smaller 
                                                                                                                 
2012, 10:01 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505268_162-57409131/could-$1t-student-loan-debt-
derail-u.s-recovery/ (discussing the future impact of the federal student loan debt on the economic 
recovery and possible future economy). 
 416. See FINAID, supra note 62. 
 417. See id. (comparing repayment plans and showing how each plan calculates its payments). 
 418. See id. 
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payment and a quicker forgiveness period.419 Nonetheless, if a 
borrower has a minimal payment under the IBR, that would allow the 
borrower to possibly spend more money on other goods and help the 
economy. 
The main hurdle is the tax consequence after the twenty-year 
period is complete. This could effectively make the situation for the 
borrower even worse at the end of the twenty-year period. If the 
remaining amount is forgiven at the end of the twenty years, then 
society can say no one received a free education. Borrowers have 
been forced to try to repay loans for twenty years, and then the loans 
will be forgiven, and the Bankruptcy Code will have been left 
unchanged. However, the concern over a “free” education remains in 
the public’s minds.420 
This government approach, particularly the IBR plan, is moving 
the federal student loan program closer to a pseudo-bankruptcy 
program. Another serious hindrance to the IBR becoming a full-
blown pseudo-bankruptcy provision is the emergence of for-profit 
colleges. A large segment of the population views for-profit schools 
as non-reputable businesses.421 
It is one approach to allow bankruptcy discharge of federal student 
loans for public and private colleges, but another approach entirely to 
allow the discharge of student loans for a for-profit college where 
someone is making a profit off of the forgiveness of federal student 
loans. This is a distinction in the public attitudes concerning for-
profit colleges and public/private institutions.422 Nevertheless, very 
expensive private colleges and universities exist, but the fact they are 
                                                                                                                 
 419. Id. 
 420. See, e.g., Matthew Yglesias, Three Problems with Making College Free, SLATE (Nov. 20, 2013, 
3:12 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2013/11/20/college_shouldn_t_be_free_three_big_ 
problems_with_free_college.html. 
 421. See, e.g., Amanda Alix, For-Profit Colleges: Architects of Dreams or Fraudulent Diploma 
Mills?, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Dec. 1, 2013), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2013/12/01/for-
profit-colleges-architects-of-dreams-or-fraudu.aspx; Tamar Lewin, Senate Committee Report on For-
Profit Colleges Condemns Costs and Practices, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/education/harkin-report-condemns-for-profit-colleges.html. 
 422. See, e.g., Karoun Demirjian, Attorneys General Target For-Profit Colleges Looking to Make a 
Buck—Especially off Veterans, LAS VEGAS SUN (June 5, 2012, 2:00 AM), 
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2012/jun/05/attorneys-general-target—profit-colleges-looking-
/#axzz2TwnAjWF9. 
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non-profit raises less concerns from the public than a for-profit 
college does.423 
There have been many reports and publications about unethical 
behaviors by for-profit institutions.424 The history of the Bankruptcy 
Code, its treatment of federal student loans, and the rise of for-profit 
school are connected.425 As the number of for-profit schools 
increases and the amount of student loan debt increases, those 
students who attend those for-profit institutions are also increasing; 
as a result, the difficulty of discharging student loans has also 
increased.426 The origins of making federal student loans more 
difficult to discharge in bankruptcy coincided with reports of for-
profit schools telling students not to worry about repaying their 
federal student loans because they could discharge them in 
bankruptcy.427 
Borrowers should never be singled-out based upon where they 
decided to go to college. For-profit institutions serve their purpose 
for students that may not be successful in a public school setting and 
cannot afford a private school setting. For-profit schools are a choice 
for those students that are in the middle. However, because of the 
public’s perception, right or wrong, that perception may affect any 
changes to the Bankruptcy Code or repayment plans that could 
benefit borrowers from these for-profit institutions. Because the 
federal government has not distinguished funding for students who 
attend public, private, or for-profit schools,428 it should not single-out 
any borrower based upon where they attend school and the public 
should not either. 
                                                                                                                 
 423. See discussion supra Part II. 
 424. See Demirjian, supra note 422. 
 425. See James Colman & Richard Vedder, For-Profit Education in the United States: A Primer, 
CTR. COLL. AFFORDABILITY & PRODUCTIVITY (May 2008), http://www.centerforcollege 
affordability.org/uploads/For-Profit_corr_2.pdf (discussing the history of for-profit institutions in 
America). 
 426. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 
§ 220, 119 Stat. 23 (containing the BAPCPA provisions). 
 427. See, e.g., Nick Pinto, National American University Gets Rich from Federal Loans, CITY PAGES 
(Nov. 17 2010), http://www.citypages.com/2010-11-17/news/national-american-university-gets-rich-
from-federal-loans/full/ (containing a story of a school telling students that they do not have to worry 
about repaying their student loans because “no one will come after you if you don’t pay”). 
 428. See FINAID, supra note 62. 
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Nonetheless, perception that students will abuse the federal student 
loan system led to the near prohibition of student loan discharge in 
bankruptcy.429 This needs to be changed, but this Article does not 
suggest an open door policy to the discharge of federal student loans. 
However, there will be an inevitable push towards easing the 
discharge rule or an alternative repayment plan such as the IBR, 
which is going to “pave the way” for the reality of a pseudo-
bankruptcy provision. 
Another step that is necessary to satisfy the public’s concerns over 
forgiving student loans is to separate private student loans from 
federally supported, or originated, loans that the borrowers have 
accumulated.430 This would at least take borrowers back to pre-2005 
bankruptcy changes.431 The IBR treats all federal student loans from 
every college, public, private or for-profit, the same in its current 
structure.432 If the evolution of the IBR will separate the treatment of 
federal student loans from private loans, then the public would be 
more receptive in permitting the discharge of federal student loans. 
Finally, the IBR has started the reality of student loan bankruptcy 
and the inclusion of federal student loans under the bankruptcy code, 
or at least a pseudo-bankruptcy concept to forgive federal student 
loans. The IBR has made the Brunner test obsolete in bankruptcy 
proceedings because of the zero-a-month payment option, and it has 
opened the real possibility of borrowers not repaying any of their 
federal student loans after forgiveness.433 As the federal student loan 
debt amount increases and the effect on the economy increases, 
Congress and the President will have no choice but to maintain the 
trend434 of easing the burden of student loan repayment. The final 
obstacle remaining is limiting loans to attend for-profit schools. 
                                                                                                                 
 429. Id. 
 430. See generally Amanda Harmon Cooley, The Need for Legal Reform of the For-Profit 
Educational Industry, 79 TENN. L. REV. 515 (2012). 
 431. See Jean Braucher, Mortgaging Human Capital: Federally Funded Subprime Higher Education, 
69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 439, 455–56 (2012) (discussing how for-profit institutions use Title IV and in-
house private loans). 
 432. See FINAID, supra note 62. 
 433. See Rhode, supra note 282. 
 434. See FINAID, supra note 62. 
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CONCLUSION 
To solve national student loan debt in this country, for-profit 
schools and their role in education must be addressed first. It is not an 
accident that spiraling federal student loan debt has occurred 
simultaneously with the growth of for-profit colleges. The movement 
in this country should be to forgive federal students loans given to 
students that have attended these institutions. However, in light of 
what happened at Corinthian Colleges, it further complicates things. 
Just forgiving federal student loans is not the proper course of action, 
especially loans obtained at for-profit schools, but rather including 
these loans once again in the bankruptcy process. 
Then only borrowers who truly cannot repay their loans would 
have them forgiven in the bankruptcy process. This would provide a 
more ‘fair’ result that voters would be content with as a result. 
However, as mentioned, this approach is hindered by the public 
attitude towards for-profit institutions is warranted. 
The concern about for-profit schools and student loans, even with 
the Corinthian College fiasco, could be alleviated with the progress 
of the IBR plans. In effect, if a student from one of these colleges 
cannot get employment, their payments under the most progressive 
IBR should be zero. Who could not afford that? The argument should 
never be “I can’t get a job so forgive my student loans.” Borrowers 
should use the IBR plan and be accountable, even if the payment is 
zero. This protects the taxpayers and protects the students that truly 
cannot repay their student loans. Thus, schools and the DOE should 
provide better education about the IBR. The public would be less 
disturbed by the news about for-profit schools if they were hearing 
that the students from Corinthian were not asking for loan 
forgiveness but placement on IBR plans until they can obtain 
employment. 
The IBR can assist with the past issues of for-profit education but 
this nation needs to be progressive in the future. Thus, the 
government needs to restrict for-profit institutions’ abilities to use the 
federal loan system in order to reduce the amount of new debt. This 
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includes the 85/15 rule for example. Then allow all students to 
include their federal student loans in the bankruptcy process, but only 
if the IBR cannot provide them a way to be accountable for their 
loans and still maintain a minimum lifestyle. This may be an 
expensive route to take, but the student loan debt is out of control. 
What else can be done? 
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